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THE INFORMATION-FORCING DILEMMA IN DAMAGES LAW

TUN-JEN CHIANG*
ABSTRACT
Courts assessing compensatory damages awards often lack adequate information to determine the value of a victim’s loss. A central
reason for this problem, which the literature has thus far overlooked,
is that courts face a dilemma when applying their standard information-forcing tools to the context of damages. Specifically, the
standard method by which courts obtain information is through a
burden of proof. In the context of damages, this means a rule requiring plaintiffs to prove the value of a loss. But courts will often
face a situation where a plaintiff can clearly prove the existence of a
loss, yet cannot prove the value of the loss with any precision. A court
that strictly enforces the burden of proof would award zero damages
in such a case, producing a harsh result. But a court that avoids this
result by instead awarding its best guess at the correct amount—effectively forgiving the inadequacy of plaintiff’s proof—then undermines future incentives for plaintiffs to produce rigorous evidence.
The result of this dilemma is that courts oscillate between strict
and forgiving approaches, causing much confusion. Explaining the
dilemma helps alleviate the confusion and points to a solution. In
principle, courts should require a party to produce more rigorous
damages evidence if, and only if, the party is the lower-cost provider
of that evidence, and the benefit of having the evidence (in facilitating a more accurate damages award) outweighs the cost of collecting
it. The messy legal standards for calculating damages in various
* Associate Professor, George Mason University Antonin Scalia Law School. Thanks to
Michael B. Abramowicz, Adam Badawi, John M. Golden, Herbert Hovenkamp, Keith N.
Hylton, Douglas Laycock, Jonathan S. Masur, Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Hillary A. Sale,
Brian Z. Tamanaha, and participants at the IP Scholars Conference, the Works-in-Progress
IP Colloquium, and a workshop at Washington University School of Law for comments.

81

82

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:081

fields can be understood as clumsy attempts by courts to arrive at
this unifying principle. Interpreting the messy doctrine in light of
this “cheaper cost-effective producer” principle thus helps make
damages law more coherent.
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INTRODUCTION
Compensatory damages awards are a matter of controversy in
many areas of law, ranging from torts to contracts to patents.1
Courts and commentators devote much attention to the problem, yet
much of the debate is under-theorized and misdirected. Specifically,
the literature often treats the problem as a matter of insufficiently
clear damages standards,2 and efforts at reform generally focus on
devising better legal standards for calculating damages.3 Such a
diagnosis, however, misses the deeper problem, which is that courts
lack the information to apply whatever legal standards might be
devised. The literature has sometimes noted the paucity of information that courts possess in regard to damages;4 but it has not

1. See, e.g., Winsness v. M.J. Conoco Distribs., Inc., 593 P.2d 1303, 1305 (Utah 1979)
(“The subject of certainty of proof as to [contract] damages has frequently concerned this
Court and most others.”); P.S. ATIYAH , THE DAMAGES LOTTERY 143-45 (1997) (arguing that
tort damages awards are akin to a lottery); FED . TRADE COMM ’N , THE EVOLVING IP
MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 162 (2011)
(arguing that there is a “lottery-ticket mentality” around patent damages); Janet Cooper
Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 STAN . L. REV. 1487, 1488
(1996) (“It is difficult for the parties to estimate the size of the potential jury award with any
degree of confidence.”).
2. See, e.g., S. REP. NO . 110-259, at 11-12 (2008) (arguing that patent “[j]uries are given
little useful guidance” in determining reasonable royalty damages); Paul DeCamp, Beyond
State Farm: Due Process Constraints on Noneconomic Compensatory Damages, 27 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 231, 258-68 (2003) (arguing that “[j]urors [r]eceive [i]nadequate [g]uidance” and
appellate review “[l]acks [p]rinciple or [p]redictability”); Mark Geistfeld, Placing a Price on
Pain and Suffering: A Method for Helping Juries Determine Tort Damages for Nonmonetary
Injuries, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 773, 776 (1995) (“The absence of well-defined standards for determining tort damages for nonmonetary injuries largely explains why such damages have been
and continue to be a focal point in the debate over tort reform.”).
3. See, e.g., S. 1145, 110th Cong. § 4 (2008) (proposing a new standard for patent
damages); Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling “Pain and
Suffering,” 83 NW . U. L. REV. 908, 909 (1989) (proposing damages schedules to “constrain the
operation of vague and open-ended legal rules and the wide latitude of discretion heretofore
given legal decisionmakers”); Geistfeld, supra note 2, at 776 (“The absence of well-defined
standards for determining tort damages for nonmonetary injuries largely explains why such
damages have been and continue to be a focal point in the debate over tort reform.”).
4. See, e.g., John M. Golden, Principles for Patent Remedies, 88 TEX. L. REV. 505, 508
(2010) (“We really have little specific sense of what the value of remedies for patent
infringement generally is or should be.”); Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and
Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM . L. REV. 2655, 2665-67 (1994) (arguing that the lack of
accurate information about damages for the typical IP right justifies property rule treatment).
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considered in much depth why this problem persists, or, in other
words, why courts cannot obtain better damages evidence.
One immediate answer to this question might be that courts cannot collect better damages information because better information
does not exist—in other words, that human knowledge is inherently
limited and courts are doing the best they can. A belief that the low
quality of damages information is due to inherent epistemic limits,
and is therefore uninteresting and not amenable to policy solutions,
may explain why there is little discussion about the topic. As this
Article will explain, however, inherent epistemic limits are not the
only cause of low quality damages evidence. Another reason—one
that better policy can improve—is that courts face an unappreciated
dilemma when attempting to obtain better information about the
value of many types of losses.
Specifically, the most obvious way for a court to obtain better
damages information is to impose a rigorous burden of proof on the
plaintiff—that is, to hold that the plaintiff must prove the true value of the loss with precision using rigorous evidence. But courts will
often face a situation in which it is clear that the plaintiff has
suffered some loss, but the plaintiff cannot prove the amount of the
loss with any precision.5 A court that strictly enforces the burden of
proof would give zero damages in such a case, producing a harsh
result.6 A court that relaxes the rule—awarding the court’s best
guess at the correct amount—reaches a better result in the individual case, but undermines incentives for future plaintiffs to produce
rigorous evidence.
One can vary the basic setup, but doing so does not escape from
the tradeoff described. For example, a court could award an intermediate amount—more than zero, but less than the court’s best
guess at the correct amount.7 This does not escape the dilemma but
simply results in a mix of both negative consequences. Awarding an
5. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Kennedy, 22 Mich. 117, 129 (1871) (“[C]ases will often occur in
which ... no element of certainty can be found by which to measure with accuracy the actual
amount of the damages, though it is evident ... that large damages have resulted from the
injury.”).
6. See, e.g., Dobson v. Dornan, 118 U.S. 10, 18 (1886) (directing an award of six cents
because plaintiffs could not prove the amount of profit attributable to infringement); Dobson
v. Hartford Carpet Co., 114 U.S. 439, 447 (1885) (directing an award of six cents).
7. See infra Part III.C.
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intermediate amount produces a somewhat unfair result that undercompensates the plaintiff, though not as severely as awarding zero,
and it somewhat undermines incentives for future plaintiffs to
produce rigorous evidence, though not as severely as fully awarding
the court’s best guess at the correct amount.
Another variation is to place the burden of proof on the defendant
rather than the plaintiff—holding that the defendant must prove
the correct amount of damages with precision, or be faced with a
massive award (say, $1 billion).8 But this merely changes who gets
saddled with the potential harsh result without diminishing the
dilemma: there will be many cases in which it is clear that the value
of the loss is less than $1 billion, but the defendant cannot prove the
exact number. A court that awards $1 billion will create an unjust
result. A court that blinks—awarding its best guess at the correct
amount—will reveal the threat to be empty, undermining incentives
for evidence production in future cases.
Understanding the dilemma leads to three payoffs. First, it provides a framework to bring together doctrinal debates in many
different areas—ranging from torts to contracts to patents—as
manifestations of a common problem. Second, it explains why the
doctrine surrounding damages throughout the law is messy and
confused. The reason is that courts reacting to the dilemma will
naturally oscillate between strict and loose approaches, depending
on which side of the dilemma is more salient at a particular moment
and in a particular case. A court facing complaints about speculative
evidence and runaway juries will favor strictly enforcing the burden
of proof to force plaintiffs to provide better evidence to support their
claims.9 A court facing outcries about deserving plaintiffs being
denied compensation will favor loosening the burden of proof to
avoid harsh outcomes.10 The result is inconsistent and messy
8. See infra Part III.B.
9. See, e.g., Garretson v. Clark, 111 U.S. 120, 121 (1884) (holding that patent plaintiffs
must prove the amount of damages attributable to the patented feature using “reliable and
tangible” evidence); Allegheny Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. Mid-Atl. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 690
F.2d 411, 415 (4th Cir. 1982) (“An antitrust plaintiff is entitled to recover only for that portion
of a price reduction caused by the defendants’ unlawful conduct.”).
10. See, e.g., Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563
(1931) (holding in an antitrust case that “it will be enough if the evidence show the extent of
the damages as a matter of just and reasonable inference, although the result be only approximate,” because “it would be a perversion of fundamental principles of justice to deny all relief
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doctrine. Contrary to common portrayal, the difficulty of damages
calculation is not caused by vague doctrinal standards;11 rather, the
inherent dilemma that courts face in collecting damages information
causes messy and vague doctrine.
Third, once the dilemma is understood, a solution emerges. The
solution comprises two principles. First, courts should only require
a party to produce information when the social benefit of the information (in enhancing the accuracy and precision of a damages
calculation) exceeds the costs of producing the information.12
Second, courts should impose the burden of proof on the party that
can produce the required evidence at lower cost.13
This “cheaper cost-effective producer” principle is obviously hard
to implement in practice. My point is not to say that implementing
this solution is easy or even feasible, but to articulate it as an organizing principle to understand what courts should be, and to some
extent are, aiming to do.14 Viewed from this perspective, the vagueness and inconsistency that characterizes damages doctrine across
the law is not just aimless flailing around by courts, but represents
clumsy attempts to arrive at a coherent principle. Articulating the
cheaper cost-effective producer principle therefore provides a
unifying lens with which to understand, interpret, and bring
coherence to the messy doctrine that characterizes damages law.15
This Article is organized into four Parts. Part I first provides a
description of the dilemma. Part II then provides several examples
to the injured person”); Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Wagner Elec. & Mfg. Co., 225 U.S.
604, 616 (1912) (stating that the burden of proof “principle must not be pressed so far as to
override others equally important in the administration of justice”).
11. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
12. Cf. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (defining
reasonable care in cost-benefit balancing terms).
13. Cf. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
139-40 (1970) (arguing for allocating the burden of avoiding accidents to the cheaper avoider).
14. Cf. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT
LAW 85 (1987) (“Hand was purporting only to make explicit what had long been the implicit
meaning of negligence.”).
15. The analogy to tort law illustrates the contribution. The importance of concepts like
the Hand formula and the lower-cost-avoider principle is not that they are susceptible to
direct implementation. Rather, the point is that they provide an analytical framework to
understand what the vague and messy doctrine of negligence is about. See RICHARD A.
POSNER, TORT LAW : CASES AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 2 (1982) (“This casebook is premised on
the belief that the Hand formula ... provides a unifying perspective in which to view all of tort
law.”).
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of how the dilemma underlies problems in damages calculation
across many different fields, such as contracts, torts, patents, and
antitrust. Part III takes the analysis further and explains that the
dilemma not only directly manifests itself in damages doctrine, but
can also be seen in various doctrinal reforms that attempt to solve
the dilemma—all of which have severe shortcomings because courts
and legislatures do not fully understand the underlying problem
they are trying to solve. Part IV then presents a solution.
I. THE INFORMATION-FORCING DILEMMA
This Part will provide a description of the information-forcing
dilemma and the dynamics by which it operates. Section A will first
set the background by characterizing compensatory damages as an
information problem. Section B will then describe how courts generally overcome information problems through the mechanism of information-forcing rules, specifically through imposing burdens of
proof. Section C will then explain why, unlike other issues in litigation, obtaining information through burdens of proof leads to
problems when it comes to assessing compensatory damages.
Specifically, courts face a dilemma when a plaintiff who has clearly
suffered some loss cannot prove the exact amount. A court in these
circumstances must choose between strictly enforcing the burden of
proof and giving the plaintiff nothing (a harsh result), or relaxing
the burden of proof and undermining its information-forcing effect.
Section D then more concretely illustrates how this dilemma
operates by examining a pair of patent cases.
A. Damages as an Information Problem
Before explaining the difficulties courts face in collecting information, we must first frame the nature of the problem. It may seem
obvious to state that courts need information to calculate damages,
and that uncertainty in damages law today fundamentally traces to
a lack of adequate information. But I will begin by defending this
premise because much of the literature focuses on a somewhat
different theory. Specifically, much of the literature treats the problem of unpredictable compensatory damages awards as arising from
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the vagueness or inadequacy of substantive legal standards.16 The
literature accordingly focuses less on improving judicial information, such as by helping courts collect better evidence, and more
on devising better and clearer substantive legal standards.17
To see why vague or defective substantive legal standards are not
the fundamental problem, it is useful to remember that, although
damages awards are often controversial in many areas, there are
also many circumstances when they are not controversial. For many
run-of-the-mill tort and contract cases involving goods that are
transacted on a readily observed market, such as if X negligently
damages Y ’s car while it is parked on the street without physically
injuring Y, the correct amount of damages is not difficult to determine and is not commonly subject to much dispute.18 This is not
because the substantive legal standard is different in such cases—
the standard for compensatory damages is the same in virtually all
areas of law where they are awarded: restore the victim to the same
position as he or she would have been in but for the violation.19 The
16. See, e.g., Jutzi-Johnson v. United States, 263 F.3d 753, 759 (7th Cir. 2001) (Posner,
J.) (arguing that the problem lies in “a standardless, unguided exercise of discretion”); S. REP.
NO . 110-259, at 12 (2008) (“The current damage statute is vague and provides little guidance
to judges or juries determining the proper damage award.”); AM . TORT REFORM ASS’N, TORT
REFORM RECORD 34 (2015), http://www.atra.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Record-6-2515.pdf [https://perma.cc/G6P9-ZXBU] (blaming “the broad and basically unguided discretion
given juries in awarding damages”); Marcus L. Plant, Damages for Pain and Suffering, 19
OHIO ST . L.J. 200, 203 (1958) (diagnosing the problem as “the absence of any standard for
measurement of the damages to be awarded”).
17. See, e.g., Jutzi-Johnson, 263 F.3d at 758 (“Various solutions, none wholly satisfactory,
have been suggested [for calculating pain and suffering damages].”); S. REP. NO . 110-259, at
13-14 (proposing new standards for patent damages); William F. Lee & A. Douglas Melamed,
Breaking the Vicious Cycle of Patent Damages, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 385, 389 (2016) (suggesting enhanced damages to deter patent infringement); Plant, supra note 16, at 210-11 (suggesting a cap); Ted Sichelman, Purging Patent Law of “Private Law” Remedies, 92 TEX. L. REV.
517, 554-60 (2014) (rejecting tort law remedies in patent law).
18. Robert N. Strassfeld, If ...: Counterfactuals in the Law, 60 GEO. WASH . L. REV. 339, 346
(1992) (“At bottom, all determinations of tort damages imply a comparison between the actual
world and a counterfactual one in which the defendant had not injured the plaintiff. Often
that comparison gives the trier of fact little pause.”).
19. See, e.g., Seymour v. McCormick, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 480, 490 (1853) (describing inquiry
as “[w]hat a patentee ‘would have made, if the infringer had not interfered with his rights’”);
McDougald v. Garber, 536 N.E.2d 372, 374 (N.Y. 1989) (“The goal [of tort damages] is to
restore the injured party, to the extent possible, to the position that would have been occupied
had the wrong not occurred.”); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 329 cmt. a (AM . LAW
INST. 1932) (“In awarding compensatory damages, the effort is made to put the injured party
in as good a position as that in which he would have been put by full performance of the
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difference is that, in the run-of-the-mill case involving a car, the
information necessary to apply this standard is easy to collect.
Courts can quite easily determine what would have happened in the
counterfactual world (Y would have had an undamaged car), and
they can also easily determine the monetary value of the difference
because there is a readily observable market (both a repair market
to fix the car and a rental market for a replacement in the interim).
When courts have reliable information to determine the state of the
counterfactual world and to monetize the difference, the legal standard for compensatory damages is not vague and is not difficult to
apply.20
My point here is not that the critics are wrong about the legal
standard being vague—it is vague and difficult to apply in some
situations—but that the vagueness does not arise from the standard
itself. Rather, the vagueness of the “but-for” standard traces to a
deeper information problem. When there is no deficiency of information about the value of the loss, there is little vagueness in the legal
standard. When courts lack information, either because they have
difficulty determining what would have happened in a counterfactual world,21 or because there is no observable market,22 then the
legal standard becomes vague and hard to apply.
Once we understand the problem of damages as fundamentally a
problem of information, the next question becomes: How can we
improve the quality of judicial information about damages? It is at
this point that the literature on information-forcing mechanisms
becomes relevant.

contract.”); ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW , PROVING ANTITRUST DAMAGES: LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC ISSUES 53 (2d ed. 2010) (“The essential starting point for any damages
quantification is the but-for premise.”); see also Hetzel v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 169 U.S. 26,
38 (1898) (“[T]he rule of damages should not depend upon the form of the action.”).
20. See Strassfeld, supra note 18, at 346.
21. See id. (“Yet often we require the factfinder to engage in much more uncertain inquiries to establish the damage award.”).
22. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND ) OF TORTS § 912 cmt. b (AM . LAW INST. 1979) (“There is no
market price for a scar or for loss of hearing.”).
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B. The Burden of Proof as an Information-Forcing Rule
If we were contemplating the question of how courts could collect
information without any preexisting constraints, there would be
many theoretical possibilities. For example, we could have judges
make direct inquiries themselves, as in fact occurs in European
inquisitorial systems.23 Or we could select jurors who already have
personal knowledge of the relevant facts, as occurred under early
versions of the jury system.24 Within our modern adversarial
system, however, judges and juries are expected to eschew personal
inquiry and instead obtain information from the parties that appear
before them.25 Specifically, courts require the party seeking redress—that is, the plaintiff—to plead and prove facts that support
recovery.26 By making a plaintiff prove his case, the law forces the
plaintiff to disclose information to the court.27
This initial insight—that courts must force information from
parties, and they accomplish this through the mechanism of a
burden of proof—is general; it applies to all issues in litigation,
including but not limited to damages. If a court wishes to discern
whether accused defendant X is guilty of shooting victim Y, the way
that the court obtains this information is not to have the judge
personally visit the alleged crime scene and collect forensic evidence, but instead to force a plaintiff—or, in the criminal context, a
prosecutor—to produce evidence to prove the proposition.28 Somewhat
23. See John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV.
823, 826 (1985) (explaining that, in the German inquisitorial system, “the court rather than
the parties’ lawyers takes the main responsibility for gathering and sifting evidence”).
24. John Marshall Mitnick, From Neighbor-Witness to Judge of Proofs: The Transformation of the English Civil Juror, 32 AM . J. LEGAL HIST. 201, 201 (1988).
25. See 9 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2483 (James H.
Chadbourn ed., rev. ed. 1981) (“The apportionment of the task of adducing evidence is one of
the most characteristic features of the Anglo-American system. It is placed wholly upon the
parties.”); 21B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE EVID . § 5122 (2d ed. 2017) (discussing “the American system of party initiation
and party presentation”).
26. See Bruce L. Hay, Allocating the Burden of Proof, 72 IND . L.J. 651, 652 (1997) (“[T]he
plaintiff is almost always assigned the burden of proof.”). As Part III.B explains, placing the
burden of proof on the defendant does not fundamentally change the dilemma.
27. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 25, § 5122 (“[T]he court can compel the parties to
produce evidence by the threat that their failure to do so will lead to a decision against them
on the merits.”).
28. I am merging two senses of “burden of proof” that are sometimes distinguished: the
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curiously, although there is a vast literature on information-forcing
mechanisms in the law,29 this literature only rarely considers the
burden of proof as an instance of such a mechanism.30 Properly
understood, however, a burden of proof is not only an apt example
of an information-forcing mechanism but also arguably the most
important example: in the absence of a burden of proof, courts would
have virtually no evidence and no information with which to make
decisions.31
Because the burden of proof is the primary doctrinal mechanism
through which courts obtain information, it follows that when courts
seek better information on some issue, the way in which they
attempt to accomplish this objective is by raising the burden of

burden of proof encompasses a burden of production and a standard of persuasion. See James
B. Thayer, The Burden of Proof, 4 HARV. L. REV. 45, 48 (1890). The information-forcing effect
I describe requires both to work in tandem. A party has an incentive to produce evidence only
if it bears the burden of production. A party has an incentive to produce quality evidence only
up to what is necessary to meet the standard of persuasion.
29. The literature on information-forcing is most developed in the context of contract
default rules. See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, The Questionable Ascent of Hadley v. Baxendale, 51
STAN . L. REV. 1547, 1553-54 (1999) (identifying limits of Ayres-Gertner model); Ian Ayres &
Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules,
99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989) (discussing “penalty default[ ]” rules in contract law that incentivize
disclosure); Eric Maskin, On the Rationale for Penalty Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
557, 557 (2006) (challenging penalty disclosure rationale of Ayres-Gertner framework); J.H.
Verkerke, Legal Ignorance and Information-Forcing Rules, 56 WM . & MARY L. REV. 899, 90608 (2015) (asserting “clause-forcing” rules because most people do not read boilerplate
language).
30. The closest articles on this topic that I am aware of are Richard D. Friedman, Dealing
with Evidentiary Deficiency, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1961, 1966 (1997) (“[A]llocation of the burden
of production is a significant tool by which the courts can make it likely that the party with
better access to the evidence will present it.”), Bruce L. Hay & Kathryn E. Spier, Burdens of
Proof in Civil Litigation: An Economic Perspective, 26 J. LEGAL STUD . 413, 413-14 (1997)
(“Optimally used, the burden of proof may minimize the expenditures devoted to gathering,
presenting and processing information in litigation.”), and Dale A. Nance, Evidential
Completeness and the Burden of Proof, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 621, 621 (1998) (arguing “that the
burden of proof should reflect the need to avoid rendering a judgment on the basis of an
evidentiary package that is unreasonably incomplete”). See also DALE A. NANCE, THE
BURDENS OF PROOF: DISCRIMINATORY POWER, WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE, AND TENACITY OF BELIEF
156-58 (2016); John Leubsdorf, Evidence Law as a System of Incentives, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1621,
1642 (2010).
31. Rules of pleading serve a similar function, and some authors have applied the
information-forcing insight to that context. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Geoffrey Miller,
An Information-Forcing Approach to the Motion to Dismiss, 5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 437, 439
(2013); Alex Reinert, Pleading as Information-Forcing, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 3 (2012).
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proof.32 In the context of assessing compensatory damages, this
translates into a rule requiring the plaintiff to prove the value of the
loss with high certainty and precision (the two work out to be the
same in this context, because uncertainty about the value of a loss
translates into an imprecise estimate).33 There are in fact cases that
suggest a very high burden of proof when it comes to damages.34
Understanding the information-forcing effect of a burden of proof
helps flesh out the rationale underlying such decisions.
One point to clarify here is that, when courts require losses to be
proven with precision, they are not merely requiring plaintiffs to get
an expert to testify to some precise number. An expert who asserts
that the plaintiff is entitled to $1 million may phrase his testimony
in a very precise manner, but the naked assertion does not prove
anything. What matters is not the style and phrasing of the
assertion, but whether the expert can provide substantive evidence
and analysis to back the assertion up—to convince the fact-finder
that the true state of the facts is that the plaintiff suffered exactly
$1 million in losses (and not $0.9 million or some other number).
32. In speaking of “raising” the burden of proof, I do not mean that a court will change the
verbal formulation from “preponderance of evidence” to “clear and convincing” or “beyond
reasonable doubt.” I mean that a court will require more certainty before considering a factual
proposition to be established. Formulations such as “preponderance of evidence” and “beyond
reasonable doubt” are often useful to express increasing certainty in binary determinations
such as guilt or liability (if one has no doubt about a defendant’s guilt, then one is very certain
of it), but they map awkwardly to increasing certainty when it comes to scalar determinations
like valuing losses. A rule that “plaintiff must prove the value of a loss to the nearest dollar
by a preponderance of evidence” requires more certainty and is a higher standard of proof
than a rule that “plaintiff must prove the value of the loss to the nearest thousand dollars by
a preponderance of evidence,” even though both use the “preponderance of evidence” formulation.
33. See WILLIAM B. HALE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 31 (2d ed. 1912) (“Losses
must be certain in amount, ... or damages therefor cannot be recovered. The burden ... is on
the plaintiff.”); see also Dobson v. Hartford Carpet Co., 114 U.S. 439, 444 (1885) (“There is but
one safe rule—to require the actual damages or profits to be established by trustworthy legal
proof.”).
34. See, e.g., Dobson, 114 U.S. at 444; Garretson v. Clark, 111 U.S. 120, 121 (1884) (“The
patentee ... must in every case give evidence tending to separate ... the patentee’s damages
between the patented feature and the unpatented features, and such evidence must be reliable and tangible, and not conjectural or speculative.” (quoting Garretson v. Clark, 10 F. Cas.
45, 45 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1879) (No. 5,250))); French v. Ramge, 2 Neb. 254, 260-61 (1872); Griffen
v. Colver, 16 N.Y. 489, 491 (1858) (“It is a well established rule of the common law that the
damages to be recovered for a breach of contract must be shown with certainty.”); Winston
Cigarette Mach. Co. v. Wells-Whitehead Tobacco Co., 53 S.E. 885, 887-88 (N.C. 1906).
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Thus clarified, it should be obvious that establishing a damages
amount with precision is often very difficult. Even market-traded
goods (such as a car) have some variance in their value—the price
of a particular model of car will fluctuate by hundreds of dollars between different dealers; nonmarket items such as physical injuries
are even harder to value with precision. The difficulty of precisely
valuing losses means that courts need a great deal of information to
do their jobs properly. It also means that plaintiffs have much
difficulty supplying the information required.
C. The Dilemma in Forcing Damages Information
The prior Section explained why courts would be tempted to
impose a high burden of proof on plaintiffs in order to force information. What this Section will explain is that such an approach has an
important limitation when it comes to damages assessment. As a
predicate matter, it is important to understand that a burden of
proof is only effective as an information-forcing mechanism if it is
enforced through a penalty for noncompliance. Rational plaintiffs
will not produce costly evidence simply because courts say that
plaintiffs have a duty to produce such evidence; they will only produce evidence if there is a private cost to the failure to produce
evidence.35 As a matter of standard common law principles, the way
that courts enforce a burden of proof is to say that a party that fails
the burden of proof will lose the issue. In the context of damages,
this principle logically translates into a rule that a plaintiff who
fails to prove the value of a loss with the required degree of precision should receive zero damages.
The problem is that a plaintiff will often be able to clearly prove
that he has suffered some loss, but at the same time will be unable
to prove the precise amount of the loss using rigorous evidence.36
For example, if a defendant negligently destroys the Mona Lisa,
then the Louvre Museum clearly has suffered some loss. But it

35. See Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM . L. REV. 1523, 1524 (1984) (“The
mere existence of an obligation or issuance of a legal command may provide insufficient motivation for obedience. In addition, a sanction or threat may be needed to induce conformity.”
(footnote omitted)).
36. See Gilbert v. Kennedy, 22 Mich. 117, 129 (1871).
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would be difficult for the Louvre Museum to prove the precise
amount of this loss because there is no easily accessible market to
establish the exact value of the Mona Lisa.37 A court that strictly
enforced a rule that plaintiffs must prove the value of the loss would
then have to award zero damages, even though it is obvious that the
correct amount of damages is not zero.38 Such a result is problematic
not only because it feels intuitively unfair, but also because denying
compensation to victims who have suffered real losses frustrates the
policy goals that compensatory damages are designed to serve.39
A court faced with the prospect of actually having to give zero
damages to a plaintiff who has clearly suffered some (unquantifiable) harm, therefore, will feel a strong temptation to avoid the
result.40 That is, instead of giving an injured victim no redress, a
court will be tempted to give an award by taking its best guess at
the correct amount, based on whatever evidence is available,
accepting that the result will necessarily involve some speculation.41
But, as soon as the court does this, it undermines the informationforcing effect of the burden of proof.
The reason is that, although a court’s guess will have a high variance, as long as the court is unbiased its average will center on the
true value.42 That is, if the true value of a loss is $50 million, a court
taking speculative and uninformed guesses will often guess too high
(for example, $90 million) or too low (for example, $10 million), but
37. One can imagine many possible ways to approximate the value, such as by looking to
recent sale prices of other famous artworks. But no methodology will yield a precise value.
38. A plaintiff may still be entitled to other remedies, such as an injunction against future
violations. See, e.g., Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis. v. Marshfield Clinic, 152 F.3d
588, 591 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding that the inability to prove future damages helps satisfy
irreparable injury requirement for an injunction). The availability of other remedies does not
alleviate the problem because the plaintiff is still being denied full compensation. See id. at
594.
39. For example, if the owner of a valuable but difficult-to-value painting knows that he
is unlikely to receive damages for harm to the painting, then the owner will have an incentive
to take excessive precautions, such as by not publicly displaying the painting.
40. See U.S. Frumentum Co. v. Lauhoff, 216 F. 610, 617-18 (6th Cir. 1914) (“To send the
successful plaintiff away after years of litigation and with only nominal damages is repellent
to the sense of justice.”).
41. See id. at 626 (“The books are full of cases where damages or profits have been allowed
upon reasoning that poorly satisfies the rules of proof.”).
42. HOWARD G. TUCKER, MATHEMATICAL METHODS IN SAMPLE SURVEYS 99 (1998) (“If z is
an observable random variable, and if ë is some real number, then z is called an unbiased
estimate of ë if E(z) = ë.”).
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it is just as likely to guess too high as it is to guess too low. The
errors will balance each other out, and the expected result is that the
court will guess the true value. A plaintiff deciding whether to
submit evidence—in a regime where courts always awarded their
best guess—will therefore reason thus: If I spend money to collect
rigorous evidence and thereby prove the true value of the loss, then
a court will award me the true value of the loss as compensatory
damages. If I spend no money and submit no evidence, a court will
take its best guess, and on average it will still award me the true
value of the loss as compensatory damages. Since the expected
recovery is the same either way, but the latter course saves the cost
of collecting evidence, I will not collect any evidence.43
Courts that face a situation where it is clear that there is some
loss, but where there is little certainty regarding the precise amount
of the loss, are thus subject to contradictory impulses: they have the
temptation to impose a strong information-forcing rule to incentivize
rigorous evidence, but also the temptation to not actually enforce
the rule with harsh zero-damages penalties.44 Of course, one cannot
have the information without the enforcement,45 and therefore
courts face a dilemma. The result of the dilemma is that courts
balance the competing considerations in an ad hoc and seemingly
unprincipled manner,46 making the case law messy and the doctrine
self-contradictory.47
43. At least if the plaintiff is risk neutral. For risk-averse plaintiffs, see infra text accompanying note 51.
44. See U.S. Frumentum, 216 F. at 626 (“[T]he cases present a constant and uncertain
contest between the desire to do what seems to be justice and the necessity of observing legal
rules.”).
45. See generally Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic
Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 630 (1984) (exploring the concept of
“acoustic separation” between rules of conduct and enforcement).
46. See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 104 (concise 4th ed. 2012) (noting the inconsistency in the case law and generalizing the state of play as the “plaintiff must
prove damages with as much certainty as is reasonably possible under the circumstances,”
while noting that “‘[c]ircumstances’ vary” and “occasionally, [even meeting the above-stated
standard] might not be good enough”). I say “seemingly” unprincipled because, as I will
explain in Part IV, one can understand judges to be mostly acting in accordance with some
implicit principles that they have not managed to articulate because they have not fully
grasped the nature of the underlying problem.
47. Compare, e.g., S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 695 F.2d
253, 261 (7th Cir. 1982) (affirming judgment of no damages because “the admitted fact of
damage is insufficient to prove the amount of damage” (quoting Locklin v. Day-Glo Color
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This dilemma is unique to the context of damages; the dilemma
does not arise during the liability phase of litigation because liability determinations are binary.48 That is, a defendant is either liable
on a claim or it is not, so if a court is unsatisfied with the plaintiff’s
proof regarding liability, it is necessarily unconvinced that there is
any liability. Finding no liability in such circumstances does not
seem unjust because the result is not clearly wrong. In contrast,
damages determinations have the characteristic that a court can be
unsatisfied with the plaintiff’s proof regarding the amount of a loss,
while still being convinced that there is a loss. Awarding zero
damages in such circumstances does seem unjust because the court
knows the correct value of the loss is not zero. The unique existence
of the dilemma in damages law means that the burden of proof
works substantially less well as an information-forcing mechanism
when it comes to damages assessments than in other areas.
The more inherently difficult it is to collect information about the
value of a loss, the more acute the dilemma becomes. This creates
a depressing irony in which the primary information-forcing mechanism that courts use (that is, the burden of proof) functions least
well precisely when courts have the greatest need for it. When the
value of a particular loss is inherently very easy to determine—such
as in the prior example of a damaged car—then the dilemma poses
little difficulty.49 A court can impose a burden of proof on the
plaintiff, and then the plaintiff will comply (because the cost to
comply is very low), and so the unappealing prospect of actually
having to impose a zero-damages penalty will not arise. It follows
that doctrine is stable and damages awards are generally uncontroversial in those situations.50 In contrast, when information about
the correct value of a loss is inherently scarce and therefore very
costly to collect (such as trying to value the Mona Lisa), then courts
Corp., 429 F.2d 873, 879 (7th Cir. 1970))), with, e.g., Fontana Aviation, Inc. v. Beech Aircraft
Corp., 432 F.2d 1080, 1085 (7th Cir. 1970) (reversing judgment of no damages because “[o]nce
the fact is established, uncertainty concerning the exact amount of loss will not preclude
recovery”).
48. A. Leah Vickers, Daubert, Critique, and Interpretation: What Empirical Studies Tell
Us About the Application of Daubert, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 109, 124 (2005) (“The law ... generally
forces its participants to render decisions and verdicts in binary pairs, such as causation/no
causation and liability/no liability.”).
49. See supra text accompanying note 18.
50. See supra text accompanying note 20.

98

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:081

will have a greater need to incentivize plaintiffs to produce better
information by imposing a rigorous burden of proof. At the same
time, the inherent difficulty of the task means that plaintiffs will
more often fail to come up with the necessary evidence, even with
strong incentives to do so. At this point the prospect of actually
imposing a zero-damages penalty will present itself, creating the
dilemma and—to the extent courts react by relaxing the burden of
proof—undermining the effectiveness of the information-forcing
mechanism.
Two qualifications should be added at this point. The first is that
plaintiffs will lose all incentive to produce evidence only if plaintiffs
are risk neutral, which is not a realistic assumption.51 I begin with
the risk neutral plaintiff merely as a way to clearly illustrate the
competing impulses that underlie the dilemma. Incorporating risk
aversion does not change the analysis significantly52: if the plaintiff
is risk averse, then the plaintiff’s incentive to collect evidence will
not quite fall to zero because a court taking a speculative guess has
higher variance than if the plaintiff provided affirmative evidence
of the correct amount. The important point, however, is that a
plaintiff’s incentive to produce evidence is weakened when courts
adopt a forgiving stance, even if the incentive does not always fall
to zero. The dilemma thus remains: a court can force better damages
information with a strict approach, or it can achieve more just
outcomes in individual cases with a forgiving approach, but it cannot do both at the same time.
The second objection is that my analysis has thus far ignored the
defendant’s ability to present counter-evidence: I have posited a
model in which plaintiffs either prove the correct amount of damages, or receive zero; or receive the court’s best guess—there is no
option for the court to award what the defendant argues. In the real
world, of course, the adversarial system features a plaintiff producing evidence and arguing for damages of $X (where $X is usually
higher than the true number), followed by a defendant producing

51. See W. Kip Viscusi, Product Liability Litigation with Risk Aversion, 17 J. LEGAL STUD .
101, 120-21 (1988) (finding that “[r]isk aversion plays a statistically significant role” in
influencing plaintiff behavior in product liability cases).
52. See id. at 121 (finding that expected payoffs play a much greater role in influencing
plaintiff behavior than risk aversion).

2017]

INFORMATION-FORCING DILEMMA

99

counter-evidence and arguing for damages of $Y (where $Y is usually lower than the true number), followed by the plaintiff producing
counter-counter-evidence, and so on. Focusing only on the plaintiff
seems to miss an important part of the story.
The reason that I focus only on plaintiffs in this Part is that this
adversarial process must start with an initial burden of proof, and
my analysis thus far is about the initial burden of proof. At this
stage of the analysis, a defendant’s counter-evidence is not yet
relevant. If courts set the initial burden of proof very high—at the
extreme, if they always enforced a rule that the plaintiff must prove
the true value of the loss with complete certainty or receive zero—
then we will never get to the stage where a defendant produces
counter-evidence (because the plaintiff will either irrefutably
establish the true amount and thus render counter-evidence moot,
or the award will be zero by default). The fact that real world
litigation regularly proceeds beyond the plaintiffs’ initial showing
and features defendants producing counterevidence shows that the
initial burden of proof is not in fact set at such a high level, but
demonstrating this proposition is a payoff of the analysis (one that
enables subsequent payoffs, such as asking and answering why
courts do not set the burden that high). My failure to discuss
defendants is not an oversight; it is because defendants are not yet
in play. In Part IV.B, I will expand my analysis to incorporate the
defendant, but one cannot get to that question without first
analyzing the initial burden of proof and the judicial dilemma in
setting it.
D. An Example from Patent Law
This Section will illustrate how the dilemma operates by examining a pair of cases on patent damages.53 The dilemma is by no
means limited to patent cases—Part II will provide examples from
other areas—but I begin with these two cases because they provide
a vivid illustration of how courts struggle with the dilemma without
realizing it.
53. See, e.g., Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014), overruled on
other grounds by Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Lucent
Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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As background, patent damages are commonly measured according to the so-called “reasonable royalty,” where courts attempt to
reconstruct what license royalty the plaintiff and defendant would
have agreed on, if they had negotiated ahead of time.54 This inquiry
is difficult because it involves a counterfactual.55 The most important evidence for the reconstruction are so-called “comparable
licenses”—licenses that the plaintiff or defendant had entered into
on similar patents covering similar technology—on the theory that
a hypothetical license between the parties would resemble similar
licenses that they had actually agreed to elsewhere.56 It turns out,
however, that instead of submitting licenses that are actually
comparable to the patent-in-suit and which would provide a plausible basis to make inferences about the true royalty, both plaintiffs
and defendants often choose licenses that are tactically advantageous but analytically useless.57 That is, plaintiffs would submit
licenses that bore little resemblance to the actual transaction at
issue, but which had high royalty rates, while defendants would
submit equally dissimilar licenses that had low royalty rates.58 The
result of juries being left with such loose evidence and contrasting
numbers was tremendous unpredictability in damages awards.59 A
54. 7 DONALD S. CHISUM , CHISUM ON PATENTS § 20.07, at 20-1188 to -1190 (Matthew
Bender ed., 2016) (“A reasonable royalty ... is judicially defined as the amount that would
have been set in a hypothetical negotiation between a willing patent owner and a willing
potential user as of the date when the infringement began.”). The underlying theory for the
hypothetical license inquiry being that, had the defendant taken a license, he would have
thereby avoided infringement. See Seymour v. McCormick, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 480, 488-90
(1853).
55. See Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, 575 F.2d 1152, 1159 (6th Cir. 1978)
(discussing the counterfactual nature of the inquiry).
56. See CHISUM , supra note 54, § 20.07, at 20-1190. (“In determining this supposititious
license rate, the courts consider a variety of factors or categories of evidence. The most influential factor is that of prior and existing licenses negotiated under the patent in suit.”).
57. See William Choi & Roy Weinstein, An Analytical Solution to Reasonable Royalty Rate
Calculations, 41 IDEA 49, 51 (2001) (describing parties who submit damages figures according
to “whichever seems to benefit them most”); see also Jonathan S. Masur, The Use and Misuse
of Patent Licenses, 110 NW . U. L. REV. 115, 156 (2015) (arguing that “existing licenses cannot
provide a useful guide to the value of a patent”).
58. See Choi & Weinstein, supra note 57, at 59.
59. See Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A Structured Approach to Calculating
Reasonable Royalties, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 627, 631-32 (2010) (“The breadth of the
available factors also means that it is difficult to exclude evidence or expert testimony
espousing virtually any theory of reasonable royalty damages, no matter how outlandish.”);
Roy J. Epstein & Alan J. Marcus, Economic Analysis of the Reasonable Royalty: Simplification
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string of large verdicts in the first decade of this century made this
problem politically salient and led to much criticism of the Federal
Circuit,60 the court with exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals.61
In response to these criticisms, in 2009 the Federal Circuit
decided Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc.62 In simple terms,
Lucent raised the burden of proof on plaintiffs to require more rigor
in damages evidence,63 specifically by requiring the “comparable”
licenses submitted to be really comparable.64 In stark contrast to
prior decisions that had cursorily allowed virtually anything to
serve as the basis for affirming a jury award,65 the Lucent court undertook a detailed examination (spanning eight pages of the Federal
Reporter) of each of the eight licenses that the plaintiff had relied
on, and explained why each license was not truly comparable to the
transaction at issue and therefore could not justify the $358 million
jury verdict.66 The court then vacated the award and remanded for
a new determination.67
The Lucent court did not specify what the district court should do
on remand if the plaintiff could not produce better licenses that met
and Extension of the Georgia-Pacific Factors, 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 555, 555
(2003) (“The overriding problem is that the [Georgia-Pacific] factors typically can be used to
justify a very wide range of outcomes.”).
60. See, e.g., Golden, supra note 4, at 507 (“Eye-catching nine-figure damage awards stoke
calls for changes to the law of patent damages.” (footnote omitted)); Christopher B. Seaman,
Reconsidering the Georgia-Pacific Standard for Reasonable Royalty Patent Damages, 2010
BYU L. REV . 1661, 1663-65 (providing a list of damages awards over $1 million as evidence
of a problem).
61. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2012).
62. 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
63. See ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY
931 (6th ed. 2013) (stating Lucent “signifies a tightening of attitudes regarding the admissibility and persuasiveness of evidence pertaining to ‘comparable’ licensing agreement[s]”).
64. See Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1325-26 (“For similar license agreements to be used as a proxy
for derivation of a fair market royalty, the form of license compensation should be on a likekind basis.” (quoting RUSSELL L. PARR, ROYALTY RATES FOR LICENSING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY 64 (2007))).
65. See, e.g., Micro Chem., Inc. v. Lextron, Inc., 317 F.3d 1387, 1392 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[I]t
is not the role of the trial court to evaluate the correctness of facts underlying one expert’s
testimony.”); Hunt Bros. Fruit-Packing Co. v. Cassiday, 64 F. 585, 587 (9th Cir. 1894) (“[T]he
only measure of damages was such sum as, under all circumstances, would have been a
reasonable royalty for the defendant to have paid. This amount it was the province of the jury
to determine.”).
66. Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1325-32.
67. Id. at 1340.
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the new standards of true comparability.68 The issue came to a head,
however, in Apple v. Motorola, where Judge Richard Posner, sitting
as a district judge by designation, excluded all of the plaintiff’s
damages evidence because it was insufficiently rigorous.69 Judge
Posner then awarded summary judgment of zero damages.70 On
appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed, holding that a district court
may not award zero damages for lack of evidence because the patent
statute states that a plaintiff is entitled to “no ... less than a reasonable royalty.”71 Rather, a judgment of zero damages is permissible
only if the evidence affirmatively proves zero is the true value on
the merits.72 To the extent the record does not have enough evidence
to support any particular award, a court or jury must simply take
its best guess.73
What the analysis of this Article contributes to the discussion
of this pair of cases is two things. First, it provides a conceptual
tool to more clearly articulate the underlying rationale in each case,
allowing a reader to see past irrelevant details and misleading
rhetoric in the formal opinions. Lucent is not just about the individual fact-specific defects of the licenses at issue; the case is more
generally about raising the burden of proof in order to incentivize
better damages evidence.74 Apple is not just about a legalistic pars-

68. See id. at 1332, 1340.
69. Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., No. 1:11-cv-08540, 2012 WL 1959560, at *6, *9-12 (N.D.
Ill. May 22, 2012), rev’d, 757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
70. Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 904-13, 924 (N.D. Ill. 2012), rev’d,
757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
71. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012); Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1327 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (“‘[T]he jury’s finding of no damages cannot be supported’ because ‘the statute requires
that damages to a successful claimant in a patent infringement suit shall not be less than a
reasonable royalty.’” (quoting Norian Corp. v. Stryker Corp., 363 F.3d 1321, 1333 (Fed. Cir.
2004))), overruled on other grounds by Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339 (Fed.
Cir. 2015).
72. Apple, 757 F.3d at 1328 (“[A] fact finder may award no damages only when the record
supports a zero royalty award.”).
73. Id. at 1327-28 (“If a patentee’s evidence fails to support its specific royalty estimate,
the fact finder is still required to determine what royalty is supported by the record.”).
74. See Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1316-17 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(invoking Lucent to reject a “25 percent rule of thumb” because “[t]he rule does not say
anything about a particular hypothetical negotiation”); ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594
F.3d 860, 868-69 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing Lucent to reverse award based on “speculative and
unreliable evidence divorced from proof of economic harm”).
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ing of the patent damages statute75—which does not define how
much is “reasonable” and thus does not textually foreclose a zero
award76—but is more fundamentally about avoiding harsh zerodamages awards on moral and policy grounds.77 Viewed through
these lenses, the cases are more significant and stand for deeper
principles than what appears at a cursory glance.
Second, besides allowing us to better understand each case on its
own, the analysis of this Article reveals how the cases irreconcilably
conflict. The Apple court does not acknowledge—it may not even
realize—that its holding is inconsistent with Lucent, but the two
cases are in fact completely at odds with each other. Lucent attempts to force plaintiffs to provide better damages evidence by
setting a high burden of proof.78 Apple effectively guts this burden
of proof by removing any penalty for noncompliance.79 The information-forcing effect of Lucent is thereby undermined.
This is not to say that Apple was wrongly decided. There are real
downsides to denying compensation to plaintiffs who have suffered
losses, just as there are real benefits to having accurate and precise
damages information. My goal in describing the conflict between the
two cases is not to take sides on which decision is better on the
merits. Rather, my point is antecedent: it is to say that there is a
tradeoff, and courts should be more aware of the competing considerations at stake. What Lucent and Apple illustrate is what happens
when courts lack this awareness: the dilemma does not go away;

75. Cf. Apple, 757 F.3d at 1327 (“‘[T]he jury’s finding of no damages cannot be supported’
because ‘the statute requires that damages to a successful claimant in a patent infringement
suit shall not be less than a reasonable royalty.’” (quoting Norian Corp., 363 F.3d at 1333)).
76. See Oskar Liivak, When Nominal Is Reasonable: Damages for the Unpracticed Patent,
56 B.C. L. REV. 1031, 1033-34 (2015) (arguing that the damages statute can be interpreted to
permit nominal damages awards).
77. Understood in this way, Apple accords with many nineteenth-century cases, which
embraced an anti-zero-award principle well before the patent statute had any language about
reasonable royalties. See infra text accompanying notes 154-60.
78. See Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[I]t
was [the plaintiff’s] burden to prove that the licenses relied on were sufficiently comparable
to sustain a lump-sum damages award.”).
79. See Apple, 757 F.3d at 1327-28 (allowing a zero royalty award only when the evidence
in the record supports a zero royalty; however, a complete lack of evidence does not require
this result).
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instead, courts unwittingly oscillate between competing approaches,
causing the law to become messy and self-contradictory.80
One response here is that the doctrinal oscillation might be
considered harmless because courts generally reach sensible results
anyway.81 My reply is that the observation is true but the conclusion
does not follow. That is, it is true that courts mostly reach sensible
results, but this is because judges apply the open-ended doctrine in
a way that the individual judge regards as intuitively sensible.82 The
fact that courts mostly reach sensible results through unreasoned
intuition, however, is not responsive to the problem that existing
doctrine does not provide coherent guidance for those results. Our
legal system is not supposed to have judges determine, Solomonlike, what constitutes a sensible result based on subjective intuition;
our legal system is built around the idea that judges are supposed
to reach reasoned decisions based on objective rules and principles.
The fact that damages doctrine is messy and provides little guidance
is thus problematic even if bottom-line results are mostly sensible.
And even from a purely consequentialist perspective, the fact that
results depend on each judge’s subjective intuition at least means
that outcomes are rather unpredictable and haphazard, which is
harmful because parties are generally risk-averse.83
II. MORE EXAMPLES OF THE DILEMMA IN ACTION
A. Contract Law
A common problem in contract law is the calculation of lost
profits.84 For example, if General Motors (GM) has a contract to buy
80. Cf. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or
Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND . L. REV. 395, 401-06 (1950) (showing
how canons and counter-canons of statutory construction conflict).
81. Cf. O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881) (“The life of the law has not been
logic; it has been experience.”).
82. See id. (“The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with
their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules
by which men should be governed.”).
83. See supra text accompanying note 51.
84. See Mark Glick & Cory Sinclair, Damages Resulting from a Lost Opportunity: The
Proper Damage Date in Utah Contract and Tort Cases, 23 UTAH B.J. 30, 30 (2010) (“The issue

2017]

INFORMATION-FORCING DILEMMA

105

engine parts from Delphi and Delphi fails to supply the parts, then
GM loses not only the engine parts, but also sales of cars that it
could have made with the parts. Contract law then allows GM to
recover the lost profits on car sales, provided that the amount of
these lost profits can be proven.85
For a company like GM, with a well-established history of sales
and detailed financial records, it is generally not too difficult to
prove the lost profits caused by a supply disruption to a high degree
of precision.86 GM usually has a good idea of how many cars it will
sell in a particular quarter based on historical sales patterns and
studies of consumer behavior, and it has detailed financial records
on the amount of profit it makes per car. If a supply disruption
causes fewer cars to be manufactured and sold, the effect can thus
be readily quantified. In these circumstances, proving the lost
profits from a breach of contract poses little difficulty.
What courts quickly faced, however, were cases in which breaches of contract led to supply disruptions for startup companies
without a record of prior sales. For example, in Evergreen Amusement Corp. v. Milstead, a contractor’s delay forced a movie theatre
to postpone its opening by three months, and the question was
whether the movie theatre could recover its lost profits from the
postponement.87 Historically, many courts imposed a demanding
burden of proof, requiring plaintiffs to prove the amount of lost
profits with “certainty.”88 Strict enforcement of this burden of proof
then led to the result that startup businesses could not recover lost
profit damages for breaches of contract because a startup business
would never have a sufficient record of prior sales to establish the
amount of lost profits with certainty.89
of how to calculate the damages from a lost opportunity often arises in contract ... cases.”).
85. See U.C.C. §§ 2-713, -715 (AM . LAW INST. & NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM ’RS OF UNIF.
STATE LAWS 2014) (allowing recovery of consequential damages).
86. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND ) OF CONTRACTS § 347 cmt. b (AM . LAW INST. 1981) (“Where
the injured party’s expected advantage consists largely or exclusively of the realization of profit, it may be possible to express this loss in value in terms of money with some assurance.”).
87. 112 A.2d 901, 902 (Md. 1955).
88. See, e.g., Griffen v. Colver, 16 N.Y. 489, 491 (1858) (“It is a well established rule of the
common law that the damages to be recovered for a breach of contract must be shown with
certainty, and not left to speculation or conjecture.”); HALE, supra note 33, § 31.
89. See, e.g., Evergreen, 112 A.2d at 904 (“[D]amages for profits anticipated from a business which has not started may not be recovered.”); see also Cent. Coal & Coke Co. v.
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This so-called “new business rule” attracted much criticism.90 In
response, courts lowered the burden of proof. Instead of requiring
“certainty,” courts relaxed the requirement to one of “reasonable
certainty,”91 and they gradually moved away from the new business
rule.92 The “reasonable certainty” formulation is now used by every
American jurisdiction,93 and the rule that startup businesses can
never recover lost profits is regarded as defunct.94
The transition from a “certainty” standard to a “reasonable
certainty” standard and the attendant demise of the new business

Hartman, 111 F. 96, 98 (8th Cir. 1901); The Lively, 15 F. Cas. 631, 634-35 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812)
(No. 8403); Cramer v. Grand Rapids Show Case Co., 119 N.E. 227, 228-29 (N.Y. 1918); Sinclair
Ref. Co. v. Hamilton & Dotson, 178 S.E. 777, 780 (Va. 1935).
90. See, e.g., Vickers v. Wichita State Univ., 518 P.2d 512, 517 (Kan. 1974) (“To hold recovery is precluded as a matter of law merely because a business is newly established would
encourage those contracting with such a business to breach their contracts.”); Bernadette J.
Bollas, Note, The New Business Rule and the Denial of Lost Profits, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 855, 855
(1987); Frank Lane Williamson, Comment, Remedies—Lost Profits as Contract Damages for
an Unestablished Business: The New Business Rule Becomes Outdated, 56 N.C. L. REV. 693,
693-96 (1978); Note, The Requirement of Certainty in the Proof of Lost Profits, 64 HARV. L.
REV. 317, 318-19 (1950).
91. See TAS Distrib. Co. v. Cummins Engine Co., 491 F.3d 625, 631-32 (7th Cir. 2007)
(“The absolute certainty requirement was reformed some time ago to the less demanding
requirement of ‘reasonable certainty.’”); M & R Contractors & Builders, Inc. v. Michael, 138
A.2d 350, 355 (Md. 1958) (“Courts have modified the ‘certainty’ rule into a more flexible one
of ‘reasonable certainty.’”); HARVEY MCGREGOR, MAYNE AND MCGREGOR ON DAMAGES § 174,
at 163 (12th ed. 1961).
92. See Bollas, supra note 90, at 859 (“The clear and growing majority of courts, however,
now apply the new business rule as a rule which delimits the sufficiency of evidence [rather
than as a categorical bar].”); see also M & R Contractors, 138 A.2d at 355 (“[T]he last hundred
years have witnessed continual modification of the once rigid rule that anticipated profits,
because inherently uncertain, were per se not a proper element of damages for breach of
contract.” (quoting Note, Speculative Profits as Damages for Breach of Contract, 46 HARV. L.
REV. 696, 696 (1933))).
93. TAS Distrib., 491 F.3d at 632 (“Today, all United States jurisdictions enforce the
requirement of ‘certainty’ in damage award amount, but limit this requirement to ‘reasonable
certainty.’”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND ) OF CONTRACTS § 352 (AM . LAW INST. 1981) (“Damages
are not recoverable for loss beyond an amount that the evidence permits to be established
with reasonable certainty.”).
94. See, e.g., 22 AM . JUR. 2D Damages § 58 (2013) (“The new business rule is not a per se
rule forbidding an award of lost-profits damages to new businesses but rather an evidentiary
rule that creates a higher level of proof needed to achieve reasonable certainty as to the
amount of damages.”); ROBERT L. DUNN , RECOVERY OF DAMAGES FOR LOST PROFITS § 4.3, at
378 (6th ed. 2005) (“Most recent cases reject the once generally accepted rule that lost profits
damages for a new business are not recoverable.... The earlier cases are either ignored or
rationalized.”).
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rule have been documented elsewhere.95 Understanding the dilemma adds to prior accounts in two ways. The first is that it provides
a fuller account of the underlying reasons and concerns that led to
courts first creating the “certainty” standard and then relaxing it.96
The “certainty” standard functions as a high burden of proof.97 Strict
enforcement of this standard has an information-forcing effect,98
which explains why some courts once thought it to be a good idea.
At the same time, strict enforcement of a high burden of proof has
the downside that it generates harsh outcomes—requiring startup
businesses to prove lost profits with certainty effectively means they
cannot recover lost profits from breaches of contract, which is both
intuitively unfair and also discourages business formation.99 These
downsides eventually led to courts relaxing the rule and undermining its information-forcing effect.
The second payoff is that understanding the dilemma gives more
meaning to the “reasonable certainty” standard. It should be obvious
that the “reasonable certainty” formulation itself is very openended; no one knows what it means, and the case law applying the
standard is not consistent.100 What the information-forcing dilemma
explains is why courts are not consistent, and it fleshes out the
competing considerations at play. To the extent that courts apply
the standard very stringently, so that “reasonable certainty” essentially requires absolute certainty, then courts will create long-term
incentives for better information disclosure. But they will also
95. See TAS Distrib., 491 F.3d at 631-32; DUNN , supra note 94, §§ 4.1, -.3, -.4, at 374-92;
John M. Golden, Reasonable Certainty in Contract and Patent Damages, 30 HARV. J.L. &
TECH . (SPECIAL SYMPOSIUM ) 257, 266-72 (2017).
96. See Comment, Lost Profits as Contract Damages: Problems of Proof and Limitations
on Recovery, 65 YALE L.J. 992, 1000 & n.43 (1956) (observing that many courts “have broken
from precedent” without “stating the reasons for their departure” and “in fact often seem
unaware of, or ignore, their departures from precedent”).
97. E. Allan Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM . L. REV. 1145,
1210-11 (1970) (characterizing the standard as a raised burden of proof).
98. Despite the extensive attention paid to information-forcing rules in the contracts
literature, I can find no one who has made this point about the certainty standard.
99. See Vickers v. Wichita State Univ., 518 P.2d 512, 517 (Kan. 1974) (“Strict application
of the certainty doctrine would place a new business at a substantial disadvantage.”).
100. See DUNN , supra note 94, § 1.7, at 21 (“Relatively few cases analyze what is meant by
reasonable certainty.”); Robert M. Lloyd, The Reasonable Certainty Requirement in Lost
Profits Litigation: What It Really Means, 12 TRANSACTIONS 11, 12 (2010) (“In spite of this
universal adoption of the language, however, courts have never really explained what they
mean by the term ‘reasonable certainty.’”).
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create harsh outcomes that undercompensate deserving victims,
such as denying recovery to startup businesses who have clearly
suffered injury from a defaulting contractor. To the extent that
courts apply the standard very loosely, so that “reasonable certainty” requires no certainty at all, then courts can avoid those harsh
and unjust outcomes, but at the price of undermining incentives for
rigorous damages evidence and creating greater uncertainty in
damages awards. Courts that seek to balance these competing
considerations naturally oscillate between the two approaches.
In this sense, the universal adoption of the “reasonable certainty”
formulation does not indicate consensus or consistency in the law
but instead merely obscures a debate that was once more transparent. Instead of different courts explicitly adopting or rejecting a
rule that startup businesses cannot recover lost profits, courts today
all purport to agree on a “reasonable certainty” standard.101 But
they apply the standard with different degrees of stringency,102 so
there is really no agreement at all.103 Understanding the dilemma
provides a conceptual tool to see that the same debate is still going
on under the surface and to bring out the competing considerations
to explain what judges are disagreeing about.
B. Tort Law
An obvious context where the dilemma arises in tort law is the issue of pain and suffering damages. The question for pain and suffering damages is not whether there is a loss—even the most diehard
skeptic concedes that pain and suffering are real losses104—but how
to quantify the loss.105 Pain and suffering are inherently difficult to
101. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
103. See Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV.
L. REV. 1733, 1739 (1995) (noting that different sides can appear to agree on a verbal formulation while glossing over substantive disagreements).
104. E.g., Paul V. Niemeyer, Awards for Pain and Suffering: The Irrational Centerpiece of
Our Tort System, 90 VA. L. REV. 1401, 1402 (2004) (“Pain is real, and, of course, the suffering
it causes is real.”); see also Kwasny v. United States, 823 F.2d 194, 197 (7th Cir. 1987)
(Posner, J.) (“We disagree with those students of tort law who believe that pain and suffering
are not real costs .... No one likes pain and suffering and most people would pay a good deal
of money to be free from them.”).
105. See Niemeyer, supra note 104, at 1402 (diagnosing as “damages that are irrationally
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value, because no readily accessible market exists by which physical
pain and suffering can be objectively translated into a monetary
amount.106 The result is that courts face a conundrum when it comes
to devising doctrinal rules for pain and suffering damages: if courts
strictly enforce a very stringent burden of proof, requiring plaintiffs
to objectively establish the value of their pain through rigorous
evidence, the result will be many zero-damages awards that deny
compensation to victims of real pain.107 But if courts allow a very lax
burden of proof, the result will be speculative awards that invite
political backlash,108 such as legislative proposals to cap awards.109
Although pain and suffering damages in one sense provide a good
example of the dilemma, I will not use them as my main example,
because any discussion about pain and suffering damages requires
entering into a predicate debate about whether pain can be valued
in money in the first place. This “incommensurability” argument is
quantified”).
106. See Flory v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 163 N.E.2d 902, 905 (Ohio 1959) (per curiam) (“Of all
the items of compensatory damages ... human pain and suffering is perhaps the most difficult
to determine.”). An important assumption of my analysis here is that it is theoretically
possible to determine a “correct” value for pain and suffering damages, even if doing so is
practically very difficult. This assumption is often contested—the counterargument being that
pain and suffering is inherently susceptible of no monetary quantification. See Margaret Jane
Radin, Compensation and Commensurability, 43 DUKE L.J. 56, 75 (1993) (discussing the
general problem of incommensurability); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and
Valuation in Law, 92 MICH . L. REV. 779 (1994) (same). To the extent one takes such a
position, however, it then becomes impossible to intelligently discuss pain and suffering
damages—no monetary amount, from zero to infinity, is either “right” or “wrong” if pain and
suffering simply cannot be measured in monetary terms. No court truly subscribes to the most
extreme version of the incommensurability argument, since every court reviews pain and
suffering damages for excessiveness, and an excessiveness standard logically presupposes that
there is some benchmark against which an award is measured, so that an award can be so
“wrong” as to be excessive. See, e.g., Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of Am., Local 114,
383 U.S. 53, 65-66 (1965) (“If the amount of damages awarded is excessive, it is the duty of
the trial judge to require a remitter or a new trial.”).
107. Cf. supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
108. See Seffert v. L.A. Transit Lines, 364 P.2d 337, 346-47 (Cal. 1961) (Traynor, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing pain and suffering award because “no evidence was introduced” on the
value of the suffering); Plant, supra note 16, at 203 (arguing that the requirements are so lax
that “unless the instruction baldly suggests to the jury that they engage in free speculation,
it is likely to be upheld”); William Zelermyer, Damages for Pain and Suffering, 6 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 27, 28 (1954) (arguing that pain and suffering damages are “conceived at the end of
a speculative and uncertain journey”).
109. See AM . TORT REFORM ASS’N , supra note 16, at 34-42 (listing laws of twenty-nine states
capping nonpecuniary damages).
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a never-ending philosophical debate beyond the scope of this Article
to resolve.110 For now, another good illustration of the dilemma from
the field of tort law is the situation in which a wrongful act does not
cause an entire injury by itself, but instead aggravates some preexisting injury—for example, when a plaintiff who was already
suffering a back injury gets worse due to an accident caused by
defendant’s negligence.111 Under standard principles of negligence
law, one might reason that the plaintiff should only be able to
recover damages to the extent of the aggravation.112 That is, if the
original back injury was worth $100, while the postaccident back
injury is worth $150, then the defendant caused only $50 of harm
and should only be liable for that amount. And indeed, many cases
stand for this proposition.113 Moreover, several cases explicitly hold
that the plaintiff has the burden of proving the amount of the aggravation.114
As an initial matter, it is important to appreciate that this rule
makes a certain amount of sense. If the goal of tort law is to compensate plaintiffs only for losses caused by a defendant’s wrongdoing,115 then courts need to figure out how much of a plaintiff’s injury
is attributable to the defendant’s wrongdoing. And the only way
they can do that is by using an information-forcing mechanism to
obtain the necessary information, or, in other words, by imposing a

110. See generally Radin, supra note 106; Sunstein, supra note 106. I will add that, to the
extent that one truly accepts the incommensurability argument, it would imply that there is
no such thing as an excessive pain and suffering award, whereas every court reviews pain and
suffering damages for excessiveness.
111. See St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co. of Tex. v. Johnson, 97 S.W. 1039, 1040 (Tex. 1906).
112. See id. (“[T]he plaintiff would be entitled to recover, if at all, ... only for the increase
or aggravation of the troubles.”).
113. See, e.g., Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mattingly, 318 S.W.2d 844, 849 (Ky. 1958)
(“L. & N. cannot be held responsible to [the plaintiff] Mattingly for his prior injury and diseased condition except to the extent that such disablement was aggravated or extended by the
one involved here.”); St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co., 97 S.W. at 1040.
114. See, e.g., Rowe v. Munye, 702 N.W.2d 729, 740 (Minn. 2005) (“[T]o require the defendant to separate the new injury from the preexisting injury improperly places the burden on
the party with the lesser amount of information and again might have the tendency to
overcompensate the plaintiff.”); Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Mannewitz, 8 S.W. 66, 67
(Tex. 1888) (“The burden of proof is on the plaintiff, Mannewitz, to show the extent of his
injuries which were caused by the turning over of the car.”).
115. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917,
918 (2010) (arguing that “tort law is about wrongs”).
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burden of proof.116 A rule requiring the plaintiff to prove the amount
of the aggravation quite logically follows from these principles.
However, apportioning the value of an injury between two causes
is generally fraught with difficulty. It is already difficult, if not
impossible, to place a monetary value on physical injuries;117 it is
even more difficult to apportion this monetary value between the
preexisting old injury and the incremental new injury.118 Requiring
plaintiffs to prove the extent of the aggravation—if one takes the
requirement seriously and demands anything even remotely
resembling rigorous precision—then becomes a de facto rule holding
that plaintiffs cannot recover for aggravations of preexisting
injuries.
It should therefore come as little surprise that there are lines of
countercases that either relax the burden of proof and allow juries
to take quite speculative guesses at the correct apportionment,119 or
eliminate the apportionment question altogether by holding that the
plaintiff can recover the entire amount of the injury.120 But both of
these options have significant drawbacks: relaxing the burden of
proof leads to speculative and uncertain damages awards, while allowing plaintiffs to recover the entire amount of the injury leads to
excessive awards that are unfair to the defendant (and induce potential victims to take too few precautions and potential injurers to
take too many).121 Because every possible rule has its own downside,
courts oscillate and the doctrine becomes incoherent and selfcontradictory.

116. See supra text accompanying notes 23-31.
117. See supra note 106.
118. LaMoureaux v. Totem Ocean Trailer Exp., Inc., 632 P.2d 539, 544 (Alaska 1981) (“[I]t
is often difficult to determine how much of a plaintiff’s injury is due to the preexisting
condition and how much to the aggravation caused by the defendant.”).
119. Id. (“The requirements of proof usually have been somewhat relaxed in such cases.”
(quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 319 (4th ed. 1978))).
120. E.g., Lovely v. Allstate Ins. Co., 658 A.2d 1091, 1093-94 (Me. 1995); Tingey v. Christensen, 987 P.2d 588, 592 (Utah 1999) (holding that the plaintiff can recover for the entire
injury because “a defendant should not escape liability because the amount of damage cannot
be proved with precision” (quoting Winsness v. M.J. Conoco Distribs., Inc., 593 P.2d 1303,
1306 (Utah 1979))).
121. See Rowe v. Munye, 702 N.W.2d 729, 740 (Minn. 2005) (declining to shift the burden
of proof to the defendant because this “could force the defendant to pay for damages he did not
cause”); see also infra Part III.B.
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C. Antitrust Law
Of all areas, antitrust law has adopted perhaps the most consistent approach to the dilemma. Ever since the Supreme Court decision in Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co. held
that “[w]here the tort itself is of such a nature as to preclude the
ascertainment of the amount of damages with certainty, it would be
a perversion of fundamental principles of justice to deny all relief to
the injured person,”122 courts have emphasized that a low standard
of proof applies to antitrust damages.123 While damages still may
not be quantified “by mere speculation or guess,” a jury is given
broad leeway to fix the amount of damages “as a matter of just and
reasonable inference, although the result be only approximate.”124
Two points are worth making here. The first is that this represents making a choice within the dilemma, not an exception to it.
Antitrust courts accept loose evidence and uncertain awards as the
price for avoiding harsh zero-damages outcomes.125 Consciously
picking one poison over another has allowed antitrust law to
(mostly) avoid the doctrinal oscillation that is seen in other areas,
but my predicate point that courts face a choice between two poisons
still stands.
The second point is that, even in the antitrust context, the
underlying policy tension inherent in the dilemma ultimately
reasserts itself, and various doctrinal manifestations of this tension
can still be seen if one looks carefully. Most obviously, antitrust law
still holds that awards may not be speculative.126 This means that
at some point courts must draw the line and hold that a plaintiff
122. 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931).
123. See Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 263-65 (1946); see also Zenith
Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123 (1969) (“Trial and appellate courts
alike must also observe the practical limits of the burden of proof which may be demanded.”).
124. Story Parchment, 282 U.S. at 563.
125. See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
126. See J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557, 567 (1981) (“[I]t is a
close question whether petitioner’s evidence would be sufficient to support a jury award even
under our relaxed damages rules.”); 2A PHILLIP E. AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW : AN
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION § 392a, at 378 (4th ed. 2014)
(“‘[S]peculative’ is an epithet that is used to characterize insufficient damage proof.”); Roger
D. Blair & William H. Page, “Speculative” Antitrust Damages, 70 WASH . L. REV. 423, 426
(1995) (conceptualizing the “speculative” standard as an ex post label that courts attach to a
conclusion that the plaintiff failed the burden of proof).

2017]

INFORMATION-FORCING DILEMMA

113

who has suffered a loss has nevertheless failed to prove the amount
of that loss with sufficient precision and therefore receives zero
damages.127 Antitrust law’s acceptance of loose evidence and
aversion to harsh zero-damages awards is not absolute, despite the
strong language (“perversion of fundamental principles of justice”)128
that might suggest otherwise. Courts are always balancing the
desire to do justice in an individual case against the need to force
litigants to produce reliable information.129 The fact that antitrust
courts somewhat tip the scales in favor of doing justice in individual
cases does not obviate the fact that there is still a balance, nor does
it remove the difficulty of the balancing act.130
Less obviously, another doctrinal manifestation is that lower
courts sometimes surreptitiously move the damages quantification
inquiry into other doctrinal silos in order to avoid the Story Parchment precedent and impose a higher standard of proof. For example,
a court might reclassify what is really an inquiry into the amount
of damages as an inquiry about causation of antitrust injury. A good
example of this move is MCI Communications Corp. v. American
Telephone & Telegraph Co., a Seventh Circuit case in which the jury
found $600 million in compensatory damages (that 15 U.S.C. § 15(a)
automatically trebled to $1.8 billion) for alleged anticompetitive
practices by AT&T in excluding MCI from the telecommunications
market.131 The $600 million number was calculated by comparing
the difference between MCI’s original business plans— showing
what a supposedly “undamaged” MCI would have earned if AT&T
had allowed MCI completely free rein—and MCI’s actual operating
numbers.132
127. See ABA SECTION ON ANTITRUST LAW , supra note 19, at 56 (“Setting a low threshold
is one thing; determining whether the threshold has been reached is another.”).
128. See Story Parchment, 282 U.S. at 563.
129. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW , supra note 19, at 56 (“Proving as a fact something that never occurred (‘what the plaintiff’s situation would have been in the absence of
the defendant’s antitrust violation’) is impossible. Resort to assumptions and inferences,
supported by real-world data, evidence, and economic theory, is inevitable.”).
130. See id. (“Many of the battles over antitrust damages revolve around whether the plaintiff has provided sufficient support for its quantification.”); AREEDA ET AL., supra note 126,
§ 392a, at 378 (“[I]t is difficult to identify a bright line that separates a ‘just and reasonable
inference’ from ‘speculation.’”).
131. 708 F.2d 1081, 1092-93 (7th Cir. 1983).
132. Id. at 1160.
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In reversing this verdict, the Seventh Circuit began by acknowledging that “the Supreme Court has been willing to accept a degree
of uncertainty in the calculation of damages” and “the amount of
damages may be determined by a just and reasonable estimate as
long as the jury verdict is not the product of speculation or guess
work.”133 After this initial perfunctory acknowledgement, it went on
to say,
It is essential, however, that damages reflect only the losses
directly attributable to unlawful competition....
...
The courts have always distinguished between proof of causation of damages and proof of the amount of damages. Thus, the
courts have been consistent in requiring plaintiffs to prove in a
reasonable manner the link between the injury suffered and the
illegal practices of the defendant.134

The court held that MCI failed to prove how much of the $600 million in lost profits were specifically attributable to AT&T’s unlawful
activities, as opposed to lawful competition, and that this was a
failure of proof of causation as opposed to one pertaining to the
amount of damages.135 It then vacated the award and remanded for
a new trial.136
It is important to see that, although the MCI court characterized
its holding as a matter of proving a causal “link between the injury
suffered and the illegal practices of the defendant,”137 its decision is
not about causation in the conventional sense, which asks whether
the defendant’s actions caused an injury that supports finding liability.138 There is no doubt that AT&T’s unlawful practices caused
MCI some antitrust injury, or that there is antitrust liability.139 The
133. Id. at 1161.
134. Id.
135. See id. at 1162-64.
136. Id. at 1168, 1174.
137. Id. at 1161.
138. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND ) OF TORTS § 9 (AM . LAW INST. 1965) (defining legal cause
as “the fact that the causal sequence by which the actor’s tortious conduct has resulted in an
invasion of some legally protected interest of another is such that the law holds the actor
responsible for such harm unless there is some defense to liability” (emphasis added)).
139. MCI, 708 F.2d at 1166-67 (“A new trial on liability is unwarranted since this court has
affirmed liability for monopolization on the basis of most of AT&T’s actions involving intercon-
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only question is the amount of damages.140 What the MCI decision
effectively requires is for a plaintiff to provide detailed and rigorous
evidence regarding the amount of damages attributable to unlawful
acts.141 This is also precisely what Story Parchment holds is not required.142 Logically, the two cases are irreconcilable; recharacterizing the issue as one of “causation” rather than as about the “amount
of damages” merely obscures the conflict.143
The contradiction between MCI and Story Parchment has not
gone unnoticed.144 Nor is MCI the only case to use some fancy footwork to surreptitiously impose a heightened burden of proof for
antitrust damages.145 My point is not to criticize the Seventh Circuit
on legal hierarchy grounds for defying Supreme Court precedent;146
nection with MCI.”).
140. Id. at 1168 (“The issue to be re-tried on remand is solely the amount of damages that
MCI is entitled to receive for those acts by AT&T which have been found to be unlawful.”); cf.
Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 567 (1931) (“That there
was actual damage due to depreciation in value was not a matter of speculation, but a fact
which could not be gainsaid. The amount alone was in doubt.”).
141. See MCI, 708 F.2d at 1168 (“MCI must be able to rationally separate these damages
from those losses (or reductions in profit) which are caused by the purely lawful competitive
actions of AT&T.”).
142. See Story Parchment, 282 U.S. at 566-67 (“Whether the unlawful acts of respondents
or conditions apart from them constituted the proximate cause of the depreciation in value,
was a question, upon the evidence in this record, for the jury.”); see also Nat’l Farmers’ Org.,
Inc. v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 850 F.2d 1286, 1306-07 (8th Cir. 1988).
143. To be clear, I am not saying that the “causation” and “amount of damages” inquiries
are conceptually indistinguishable when properly conceived. I am saying that MCI distorts
the concept of causation.
144. See James R. McCall, The Disaggregation of Damages Requirement in Private
Monopolization Actions, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 643, 670 (1987) (“The proof standard mandated by the disaggregation requirement ... has been rejected in antitrust treble damage actions
under the decisions of the Supreme Court.”); M. Sean Royall, Disaggregation of Antitrust
Damages, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 311, 311 (1997) (“Within the sea of case law upholding broadly
permissive standards for proof of antitrust damages, there is a competing undercurrent
known as the disaggregation rule.”).
145. See, e.g., Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039, 1057 (8th Cir. 2000)
(excluding plaintiff’s damages theory “because it did not separate lawful from unlawful conduct”); Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1224 (9th Cir. 1997)
(“The ISOs must segregate damages attributable to lawful competition from damages
attributable to Kodak’s monopolizing conduct.”).
146. Indeed, the MCI court’s reasoning quite plausibly follows from another line of Supreme Court decisions starting with Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S.
477, 489 (1977), which held that an antitrust violation that causes competitive injury to a
plaintiff might not support any damages if the technically unlawful conduct ultimately
benefits consumers. Brunswick’s rationale can be extended to implicitly require plaintiffs to
prove the amount of consumer injury.
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rather, it is to illustrate how a deep-seated policy tension ultimately
reasserts itself notwithstanding a Supreme Court decision. Doctrinal technicalities about the difference between causation and amount
of damages are mere excuses; what is really driving the conflict is
a policy tension between the benefits of a rigorous burden of proof
in forcing information, and the desire for just outcomes and aversion
to harsh zero-damages awards.147 One cannot understand the
interaction between MCI and Story Parchment without understanding the underlying policy dispute at stake, and one cannot understand the policy dispute without understanding the informationforcing dilemma.
D. Nineteenth-Century Patent Law
The dilemma is not a new problem: courts have been facing the
dilemma for as long as courts have been awarding compensatory
damages. The timelessness of the problem is partially demonstrated
by the fact that many of the cases in my contract law discussion are
quite old.148 But to really bring this point home, it is useful to compare the modern patent cases that I discussed in Part I.D with some
older cases.
As background, although the standard measure of damages in
patent law today is the “reasonable royalty,”149 early patent law did
not use this formulation. Instead, patentees who wished to recover
lost royalty revenue had to prove an “established royalty,” that is,
a royalty rate established by a long record of prior licenses.150 As the
Supreme Court held in Rude v. Westcott:
In order that a royalty may be accepted as a measure of damages against an infringer, who is a stranger to the license
147. See McCall, supra note 144, at 652 (“The burden of persuasion and the standard of
proof are important concepts to keep in mind when considering the disaggregation requirement.”); Charles N. Charnas, Comment, Segregation of Antitrust Damages: An Excessive
Burden on Private Plaintiffs, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 403, 423 (1984) (“A literal application of the
segregation doctrine may reduce the possibility of speculative treble damage awards, but it
may also raise the plaintiff’s burden of building a prima facie case.”).
148. See supra Part II.A.
149. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012).
150. See Birdsall v. Coolidge, 93 U.S. 64, 68 (1876) (“That when a person, without license,
appropriates the patented invention of another, the measure of damages, if a royalty has been
established, is the regular royalty paid by purchasers and licensees.”).
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establishing it, it must be paid or secured before the infringement complained of; it must be paid by such a number of persons
as to indicate a general acquiescence in its reasonableness by
those who have occasion to use the invention; and it must be
uniform at the places where the licenses are issued.151

Viewed from a law and economics perspective, the rationale
underlying this rule should be obvious: the rule forces the production of more rigorous evidence of comparable licenses.152 Determining the true amount of lost royalties is generally very difficult
because the question ultimately comes down to what royalty the
patentee and defendant would have agreed on if they had (counterfactually) negotiated ahead of time, when in fact no negotiation
occurred.153 A court can construct the counterfactual with more
confidence if it has an extensive record of prior licenses with a
single, uniform royalty rate—if everyone else had agreed to the
same royalty rate for the same patent, then it is likely that the
defendant would also have agreed to this royalty rate as well.154 A
rule that patentees seeking to recover royalty damages must
produce an extensive record of prior licenses thus has an information-forcing effect.
The problem that courts quickly confronted were situations where
it was not possible for a plaintiff to meet the burden of proof because
the evidence demanded did not exist—either there were no (or only
a few) prior licenses, or the licenses did not have a single, uniform
royalty rate.155 Under the logic of Rude, a court in such a situation
would then have to deny the patentee all recovery for lost royalties.156 This outcome would be quite unjust, as the patent clearly has
151. 130 U.S. 152, 165 (1889).
152. See Diamond Stone-Sawing Mach. Co. v. Brown, 166 F. 306, 309 (2d Cir. 1908) (“The
rule which we sanction requires proof instead of conjecture and facts instead of theories.”).
153. See supra text accompanying notes 54-55.
154. As Jonathan Masur has argued, a gap between the evidence and the hypothetical
inquiry remains because the hypothetical inquiry is supposed to assume that the patent is
fully valid and infringed, whereas real-life licenses are almost never negotiated under such
conditions. Masur, supra note 57, at 130-31. But having robust evidence of comparable
licenses is at least better than not having such evidence.
155. See, e.g., Coupe v. Royer, 155 U.S. 565, 583-84 (1895); Hunt Bros. Fruit-Packing Co.
v. Cassiday, 64 F. 585, 587 (9th Cir. 1894).
156. See Rude, 130 U.S. at 167 (ordering nominal damages); see also Coupe, 155 U.S. at 583
(same). A patentee could still pursue other theories, such as for lost profits from displaced
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at least some value (the defendant did, after all, use the patented
technology, and presumably would not have done so if it has
absolutely no value) and a rational defendant would thus have been
willing to pay some royalty for it.157 The analytical question is not
whether there has been any lost royalty, but how much the lost
royalties are.158 We thus have another example of the (now familiar)
setup of a doctrinal rule logically calling for giving plaintiffs zero
damages because they cannot prove exact amount of the loss, when
no one thinks that zero is actually the correct amount as a firstprinciples matter.
What courts did in response was to develop the “reasonable
royalty” doctrine, which largely replicated the established royalty
analysis but with a lower burden of proof.159 Instead of requiring
patentees to rigorously prove an established royalty amount
through an extensive record of prior licenses (on pain of receiving no
royalty damages at all), juries would now be permitted to fix the
royalty damages at an amount they found to be “reasonable.”160 As
Judge Learned Hand observed, this methodology was hardly ideal
as a matter of informed decision-making or precise awards, but it
had a very big upside in avoiding harsh zero-damages awards: “The
whole notion of a reasonable royalty is a device in aid of justice,
by which that which is really incalculable shall be approximated,

sales. But not every patentee has displaced sales—nonpracticing patentees, for example,
would not have any sales to lose. See Rude, 130 U.S. at 167 (stating that there was no issue
of lost profits because “no machines had been manufactured and put on the market by the
patentee”). Moreover, even when it is clear that there are some lost sales, the amount of lost
profits is also very hard to prove, so the dilemma repeats itself. See Mark A. Lemley,
Distinguishing Lost Profits from Reasonable Royalties, 51 WM . & MARY L. REV. 655, 656 (2009)
(arguing that “courts have distorted the reasonable royalty measure in various ways” in order
to allow recovery for “patent owners who have in fact probably lost sales to infringement [but]
cannot prove lost profits damages” due to “strict standards of proof”).
157. See Hunt Bros., 64 F. at 587 (“The plaintiff was clearly entitled to damages for the infringement.”).
158. See U.S. Frumentum Co. v. Lauhoff, 216 F. 610, 616-17 (6th Cir. 1914) (“It is a travesty to allow property rights to be seized and enjoyed without remedy simply because of the
supposed difficulty in establishing their value.”).
159. Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 648 (1915) (stating that
where there is no established royalty, “it was permissible to show the value by proving what
would have been a reasonable royalty”).
160. Id. at 648-49 (“This amount it was the province of the jury to determine.” (quoting
Hunt Bros., 64 F. at 587)).
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rather than that the patentee, who has suffered an indubitable
wrong, shall be dismissed with empty hands.”161
At this point we catch up to the story told in Part I.C. The lax
standards that applied to reasonable royalty calculations eventually
led to complaints about unpredictable awards and runaway juries.162
This situation then prompted the Federal Circuit to attempt to
tighten standards of proof in Lucent.163 Although Rude and Lucent
are separated by a vast distance in time and are ostensibly about
two different doctrines164—Rude is about the “established royalty”
doctrine while Lucent is about the “reasonable royalty” doctrine—
the two decisions share many similarities. At a fundamental level,
both opinions are trying to make the calculation of lost royalties
more rigorous and precise by demanding plaintiffs produce truly
comparable licenses.165 Although Lucent does not go nearly as far as
Rude did—Rude spelled out a list of onerous bright-line requirements for what plaintiffs must provide—the underlying logic of both
decisions is the same.
The similarities do not end there. Rude was eventually undermined by later decisions and today is defunct.166 Similarly, as
discussed in Part I.C, Lucent has been significantly undermined by
the Federal Circuit’s later decision in Apple v. Motorola.167 The
reason for this eventual undermining of a strict rule requiring
plaintiffs to produce rigorous evidence of truly comparable licenses
in both cases is the same: the strong desire to award something to
a patentee who has “suffered an indubitable wrong,” rather than
dismissing the patentee with “empty hands.”168 To be sure, the
specific mechanism for this undermining differs slightly between
161. Cincinnati Car Co. v. N.Y. Rapid Transit Corp., 66 F.2d 592, 595 (2d Cir. 1933) (emphasis added).
162. See supra text accompanying notes 51-59.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 60-67.
164. Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Rethinking Patent Damages, 10 TEX . INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 1, 7 n.21 (2001).
165. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 63, at 931.
166. JOHN SKENYON ET AL., PATENT DAMAGES LAW AND PRACTICE § 3:15 (2016) (“[A] patent
owner [is] no longer required to prove each of the Rude requirements to obtain damages.”).
167. See supra text accompanying notes 69-73.
168. Cincinnati Car Co. v. N.Y. Rapid Transit Corp., 66 F.2d 592, 595 (2d Cir. 1933); see
also U.S. Frumentum Co. v. Lauhoff, 216 F. 610, 617-18 (6th Cir. 1914) (“To send the successful plaintiff away after years of litigation and with only nominal damages is repellent to the
sense of justice.”).
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the two cases. In the context of Rude, courts moved claims for
royalty damages to a new doctrinal silo—from “established royalty”
to “reasonable royalty”—which allowed them to shed disfavored
prior precedent without any formal inconsistency between decisions
(Rude is technically still good law with respect to claims for
established royalties;169 it is just that hardly anybody ever makes
such a claim). In the context of Lucent, the inconsistency with the
later decision in Apple is more direct.170 But, despite this superficial
difference, the underlying dynamics are the same. Patent law is
essentially having the same debate about damages in the twentyfirst century as it had at the end of the nineteenth; we have made
no progress in over one hundred years. Explicating the informationforcing dilemma helps bring this (depressing) point out clearly.
III. SECOND-LEVEL REACTIONS TO THE DILEMMA
Thus far, I have described what might be considered the “firstlevel” version of the dilemma. That is, low-quality damages information leads to courts imposing a high burden of proof (to force better
information). A case then arises where a plaintiff has clearly suffered loss but cannot prove the exact amount, and the court is
unwilling to impose a harsh zero-damages award. The aversion to
harsh zero-damages awards, in turn, undermines the informationforcing effect, landing us back to square one. As Part II demonstrated, even this basic version of the dilemma has much explanatory
power in providing a way to understand the development of
damages doctrine in many areas of law.
This Part goes a step further. Although courts have not fully
understood the dilemma, they have always been facing the underlying problem, and courts and legislatures have reacted to it in
various ways beyond simply oscillating between strict and loose
burdens of proof. This Part will discuss additional strategies that
courts and legislatures have tried. The payoff is twofold. First, the
information-forcing dilemma provides a unifying lens that allows us
to see all of these additional strategies—which often bear little
superficial resemblance to each other—as reactions to the same
169. Blair & Cotter, supra note 164, at 7 n.24.
170. See supra text accompanying note 76.
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underlying problem. Second, fully appreciating the nature of the
underlying dilemma allows us to understand why these attempted
solutions have not worked. Namely, because lawmakers have not
fully understood the problem they were trying to solve, the solutions
they attempt have always been incomplete, and whichever side of
the dilemma is not addressed by a solution ends up reasserting
itself over time.
A. The Fact/Amount Rule
Courts have not been entirely unaware of the dilemma described
in this Article. Indeed, many courts have recognized one facet or
another of the problem. For example, in the early case of Gilbert v.
Kennedy, the Supreme Court of Michigan described the downside of
a strict approach in these terms:
[C]ases will often occur in which, first, no reliable data, no
element of certainty can be found by which to measure with
accuracy the actual amount of the damages, though it is evident
to the court and jury that large damages have resulted from the
injury .... [A]re the jury to give merely nominal, or what is the
same thing, no damages, and is the injured party to obtain no
redress, because the case happens to be one which does not
furnish a rule for their accurate measurement? ... To deny the
injured party the right to recover any actual damages in such
cases, because they are of a nature which cannot be thus
certainly measured, would be to enable parties to profit by, and
speculate upon, their own wrongs, encourage violence and invite
depredation.171

The most common doctrinal result to emerge from this line of
reasoning is the fact/amount rule: “[O]nce the plaintiff has met its
burden of proving the fact of damage, some uncertainty with respect
to the amount of damages will not preclude recovery.”172 This
171. 22 Mich. 117, 129-30 (1871).
172. J.F. Feeser, Inc. v. Serv-A-Portion, Inc., 909 F.2d 1524, 1539 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing
Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 562 (1931)); see also
Adams v. United States, 358 F.2d 986, 993 (Ct. Cl. 1966) (per curiam) (“[U]ncertainty as to
the amount of the damage does not preclude recovery where the fact of damage is clearly
established.” (quoting Addison Miller, Inc. v. United States, 70 F. Supp. 893, 900 (Ct. Cl.
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statement, or something substantially similar, appears throughout
the case law and in leading treatises.173
Once analyzed, it becomes apparent that the fact/amount rule
does not escape the dilemma but simply represents a statement
favoring the “award the court’s best guess” approach. If uncertainty
as to the value of a loss does not preclude recovery—so long as the
court is certain of the fact of injury and so the amount is more than
zero—what is a court supposed to award except its best guess at the
correct amount? The fact/amount rule’s stated principle of “do not
award zero in situations of uncertainty” thus logically174 translates
into a corollary principle of “award the best guess in situations of
uncertainty.”175 This lands us right back at the problem that, if
courts always awarded their best guess at the correct amount in
situations of inadequate information, then plaintiffs would have no
incentive to produce rigorous evidence and better information.
It should therefore be unsurprising that there is a line of countercases that state that plaintiffs must prove both the fact and amount
of damages with reasonable certainty,176 with the implication that
failure to prove the value of the loss with sufficient certainty will
lead to zero damages.177 This counter-rule also appears in leading

1947))).
173. See, e.g., 22 AM . JUR. 2D Damages § 719 (2013) (“Damages are considered ‘speculative’
if there is an uncertainty concerning the fact of damages, not the amount.”); 25A C.J.S.
Damages § 363 (2017) (“Where it clearly appears that a party has suffered damage, uncertainty as to the exact amount thereof will not bar recovery.”); DUNN , supra note 94, § 1.8
(collecting cases).
174. A less-principled third option is to award some intermediate amount. I address that
possibility in Part III.C.
175. See Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 565 (1931)
(“[S]uch reasonable and probable estimate, as in the exercise of good sense and sound judgment they shall think will produce adequate compensation.” (quoting Gilbert, 22 Mich. at
131)).
176. See, e.g., Cole v. Homier Distrib. Co., 599 F.3d 856, 864 (8th Cir. 2010) (“[A] plaintiff
in a contract action generally has the burden of proving ‘the existence and amount of ...
damages with reasonable certainty.’ ... The failure to meet this burden properly results in
summary judgment.” (omission in original) (quoting Ulrich v. CADCO, Inc., 244 S.W.3d 772,
779 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008))); Aldon Indus., Inc. v. Don Myers & Assocs., 517 F.2d 188, 191 (5th
Cir. 1975).
177. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 695 F.2d 253, 261 (7th Cir.
1982) (affirming judgment of no damages because “the admitted fact of damage is insufficient
to prove the amount of damage” (quoting Locklin v. Day-Glo Color Corp., 429 F.2d 873, 879
(7th Cir. 1970))).
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treatises.178 The two logically incompatible lines of case law then sit
side-by-side, their incompatibility unacknowledged but very real,
creating messy doctrine.179
B. Reversing the Burden of Proof
To this point, I have presented the dilemma as a complication
that arises when courts attempt to apply the burden of proof
to—and force information from—the plaintiff. Yet there is no
intrinsic reason that courts must confine their information-forcing
attempts to the plaintiff side of the ledger. A court can place the
burden of proof on either plaintiffs or defendants.180 And if a court
places the burden of proving damages on a defendant, then the
harsh result of denying recovery to an injured plaintiff merely
because plaintiff cannot prove the precise amount of the loss will not
arise. Superficially, therefore, reversing the burden of proof seems
a viable solution to the dilemma described in Part I.
The copyright statute can be understood as incorporating the logic
described in the prior paragraph. As background, copyright law
often faces a situation where less than all of the revenue from an
infringing product is properly attributable to copyright infringement.181 For example, if a book by Taney makes one hundred dollars
in sales and contains one chapter that is plagiarized from Marshall,
then Taney infringes Marshall’s copyright. But it would be difficult
to argue that Marshall should receive the entire one hundred
dollars in revenue from Taney’s book—some of that revenue is
properly attributable to Taney’s own contributions and to the
expenses of printing the book.182 A court cannot easily determine the
178. See, e.g., 22 AM . JUR. 2D Damages § 719 (2013) (“Generally, the burden of proof is upon
the plaintiff ... to show the fact and extent of an injury and to show the amount and value of
the plaintiff’s damages.”); 25A C.J.S. Damages § 305 (2017) (“The plaintiff also has the burden
of proving the amount of damages with reasonable certainty.” (footnotes omitted)).
179. See LAYCOCK , supra note 46, at 104 (noting the tension between the fact/amount rule
and cases that reject plaintiff’s proof as speculative “even when it seems clear that plaintiff
suffered some damages”).
180. Hay, supra note 26, at 652 (providing some considerations in allocating the burden of
proof). In principle, a court can even force information from third parties, FED . R. CIV. P.
45(b)(2), (g), but I will limit my consideration to only parties in litigation.
181. See, e.g., Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 396 (1940).
182. See id. at 405 (“[W]e perceive no ground for saying that ... the court may make an
award of profits which have been shown not to be due to the infringement.”).
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relative proportion by some mechanical formula,183 such as using the
number of plagiarized pages to the number of nonplagiarized
pages—after all, the pages written by Marshall might be really
important, even if small in number. Because courts do not inherently have sufficient information to make the apportionment
decision, they need to impose a burden of proof to obtain better
information.
By its terms, § 504(b) of the copyright statute allocates the burden
of proof as follows: “In establishing the infringer’s profits, the
copyright owner is required to present proof only of the infringer’s
gross revenue, and the infringer is required to prove his or her
deductible expenses and the elements of profit attributable to
factors other than the copyrighted work.”184
In effect, this statute allocates the burden of proving the value of
the copyrighted portion to the defendant.185 That is, the value of the
copyrighted portion of a larger work must logically be the total value
of the larger work, minus everything that is not attributable to the
copyrighted portion. By requiring the defendant to prove how much
of the profit from the larger work is not attributable to copyright
infringement, therefore, the copyright statute implicitly makes the
defendant also prove how much of the profit is so attributable. And
allocating the burden of proof to the defendant avoids the problem
of plaintiffs getting stuck with zero awards due to failure of proof.
However, the statutory methodology produces a problem on the
other side: literally applied, it tends to produce absurdly large
awards. Consider, for example, the case of Polar Bear Productions,
Inc. v. Timex Corp., in which the watchmaker Timex used some
copyrighted content owned by Polar Bear in its advertising for

183. See id. at 404 (discussing the “the difficulty of making an exact apportionment”).
184. 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (2012). Strictly speaking, this provision relates to disgorging profits
and not to compensatory damages. The two measures are not always the same because if an
infringer is a more efficient producer than the copyright holder, then he will earn more profits
than the copyright holder otherwise could have, and the extra profits do not represent a “loss”
as such. See Robert L. Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic
Efficiency, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 273, 284 (1970) (describing the concept of an efficient breach
of a legal obligation). However, the problem of inadequate information applies equally when
calculating compensatory damages and calculating profits, so I will not distinguish between
them in this Article.
185. Frank Music Corp. v. Metro-Golden-Mayer, Inc., 772 F.2d 505, 518 (9th Cir. 1985)
(“The burden of proving apportionment ... is the defendant’s.”).
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“Expedition” brand watches.186 Polar Bear sued and won, and the
primary issue was the amount of money to be awarded.187 Following
the plain text of the statute, Polar Bear argued that it was entitled
to claim profits based on the total sales of Expedition watches.188
The court rejected this claim, reasoning that such a methodology
would result in an excessive award:
Although the statute only references the broad term “gross
revenue,” to conclude that a copyright plaintiff need only provide
the company’s overall gross revenue, without regard to the
infringement, would make little practical or legal sense. Otherwise, the plaintiff in a copyright action against a multidivision,
multi-product company such as General Mills, would need to do
nothing more than offer an overall gross revenue number—like
$11.5 billion—and sit back.189

The court instead held that “a copyright plaintiff must present a
modicum of proof linking the infringement to the profits sought” and
vacated the jury award because Polar Bear had failed to present
sufficient evidence.190
The point that § 504(b), when literally applied, produces absurdly
large awards is not a new one. Courts have repeatedly noted this
problem.191 The contribution of my analysis is not to simply repeat
this well-known point but to add more depth to the analysis: to
explain what § 504(b) is trying to accomplish, why rational lawmakers would ever have enacted it, and how attempts to overcome the
downsides of § 504(b) lead to their own problems.
From the perspective of the information-forcing dilemma, § 504(b)
is a second-level reaction to the problems that arise from a firstlevel attempt to solve the dilemma. That is, because courts do not
inherently possess information about the correct apportionment of
value between the infringing aspects of a work and the nonin186. 384 F.3d 700, 703-04 (9th Cir. 2004).
187. Id. at 703.
188. Id. at 715 (“Polar Bear claimed a portion of Timex’s profits from all Expedition watch
sales.”).
189. Id. at 711.
190. Id. at 715-16.
191. See, e.g., Bonner v. Dawson, 404 F.3d 290, 294 (4th Cir. 2005); Davis v. The Gap, Inc.,
246 F.3d 152, 160 (2d Cir. 2001); Taylor v. Meirick, 712 F.2d 1112, 1122 (7th Cir. 1983).
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fringing aspects, courts must obtain the needed information from
parties using an information-forcing mechanism.192 If we followed
traditional legal principles and required the plaintiff to prove the
correct apportionment,193 then what would happen is that we would
get the first-level dilemma described in Part I, where plaintiffs
would often be unable to prove the correct apportionment with any
precision and would therefore get nothing. In order to combat the
problem of zero awards, Congress reversed the burden of proof and
placed the burden of proof on defendants.194
This second-level reaction to the first-level dilemma, however,
does not really solve the dilemma but simply changes the direction
in which the problem manifests. We no longer have a problem of
plaintiffs facing unjust, undercompensatory, zero-damages awards
because they cannot comply with an impossibly onerous burden of
proof. We get instead a problem of defendants facing unjust, overcompensatory, total-revenue awards because they cannot comply
with an impossibly onerous burden of proof.195 And relaxing the
burden of proof in both instances will undermine the informationforcing effect and leave courts struggling to come up with the correct
apportionment by themselves. The shoe is on the other foot, but the
fundamental dynamics of the dilemma remain the same.
Courts react to this second-level problem by creating a third-level
solution: they require copyright holders like Polar Bear to prove a
causal link between the infringement and the claimed profits.196 But
this is just re-reversing the burden of proof. Now Polar Bear must
prove how much profit is attributable to infringement, in default of

192. See supra Part I.
193. HALE, supra note 33, § 31 (“Losses must be certain in amount ... or damages therefor
cannot be recovered. The burden ... is on the plaintiff.”).
194. See Lottie Joplin Thomas Tr. v. Crown Publishers, Inc., 592 F.2d 651, 657 (2d Cir.
1978) (“[P]lacing the apportionment burden on defendants best comports with our admonition
that in apportioning profits ‘every indulgence should be granted plaintiff in an attempt to
arrive at a sum which is assuredly adequate.’” (quoting Orgel v. Clark Boardman Co., 301
F.2d 119, 121-22 (2d Cir. 1962))).
195. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F.2d 45, 49 (2d Cir. 1939) (“[I]t is
nearly as unfair to cast the infringer for all the profits, as it would be to deny the patentee or
author any recovery whatever.”), aff’d, 309 U.S. 390 (1940).
196. Polar Bear Prods., Inc. v. Timex Corp., 384 F.3d 700, 715 (9th Cir. 2004); see, e.g.,
Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 520-23 (4th Cir. 2003); Univ. of
Colo. Found., Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 196 F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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which it cannot recover any profit at all.197 Of course, plaintiffs like
Polar Bear will have tremendous difficulty precisely proving how
much profit is attributable to the infringement, and strictly enforcing the burden of proof means that Polar Bear recovers nothing—
even though nobody thinks that Timex truly made no profit from its
infringement.198 In short, this third-level reaction takes us full circle
back to the dilemma in its original form.
C. Intermediate Award Amounts
If the reaction that triggers the dilemma is that a zero award
feels particularly harsh when a plaintiff fails the burden of proof,
then an obvious solution is that a court should not award zero, but
should award an intermediate amount—that is, more than zero, but
less than the court’s best estimate of the fully compensatory
amount. Awarding an intentionally low-ball amount when the court
is unsatisfied with the plaintiff’s damages evidence would at first
glance seem to achieve the best of both worlds: it avoids the extreme
harshness of a zero award, yet it still provides plaintiffs with some
incentive to produce better evidence in future cases because successfully proving the true value of the loss would lead to a higher
expected award than the intentionally low-ball guess.
This strategy is rarely explicitly suggested—what court is going
to admit to intentionally giving an incorrect amount?—but one
might suspect that it occurs quietly in practice. And hints of this
strategy can occasionally be found if one looks carefully. For
example, in Apple v. Motorola, after the Federal Circuit rejected the
trial judge’s awarding zero damages for insufficient evidence,199 the
court went on to say that “if the patentee’s proof is weak, the court
is free to award a low, perhaps nominal, royalty.”200 This suggests
that district courts may somewhat reduce the damages award as a

197. Polar Bear, 384 F.3d at 716 (vacating entire award).
198. See id. at 715 (acknowledging this with the statement “even if we suspect that Timex
derived some quantum of profits from the infringement because its infringement was part of
promotional efforts”).
199. See supra text accompanying notes 69-73.
200. 757 F.3d 1286, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2014), overruled on other grounds by Williamson v.
Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015).

128

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:081

penalty for insufficient evidence, so long as the reduction does not
go all the way to zero.
For purposes of my argument here, the important point is that an
intermediate approach is not a refutation of the dilemma but a
manifestation of it.201 That is, the dilemma is about a tradeoff between promoting incentives for rigorous information in the long run
versus the desire to reach just outcomes in an immediate case. This
tradeoff is not a dichotomy but a spectrum. I have devoted attention
thus far to describing the extreme ends of the spectrum—either
awarding no damages at all (strongest information-forcing incentives), or awarding full compensation (best outcome for the individual case)—simply to illustrate the consequences that are at stake in
the tradeoff.202 An intermediate result within this spectrum mixes
those consequences but does not escape the tradeoff. A court that
awards a nonzero but low-ball amount creates a somewhat undercompensatory result that somewhat frustrates the policy goals of
compensatory damages (for example, if patentees know that courts
give low-ball awards, this will negatively affect the incentives to
invent that the patent system is designed to foster), while it also
somewhat undermines future incentives for rigorous evidence.203
The essential dilemma remains unchanged. A court could provide
stronger incentives for better evidence by going closer to a zero
award, but only at the cost of a harsher outcome in the individual
case before it. Conversely, a court could create a better outcome in
the case before it by going closer to its estimate of the fully compensatory amount, but only at the cost of more severely undermining
future incentives for rigorous evidence. Courts that desire to achieve
both objectives are thus still trapped in a dilemma about what to do.
The fact that intermediate award amounts represent a pragmatic
compromise between two principles—following neither one to its
logical conclusion—also means that as a solution it fits awkwardly
within our legal system, which is one where courts are supposed to
make decisions according to logic and principle.204 Courts do not
201. In this sense, an intermediate award strategy is not even a second-level reaction to
the dilemma but is a first-level manifestation of the dilemma itself.
202. See supra Part II.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 41-43.
204. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 15 (1959) (“[T]he main constituent of the judicial process is precisely that it must be
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openly say that they award intermediate amounts because they
have no principle to explain and justify such decisions;205 an intermediate award is neither the correct amount the victim deserves as
compensation, nor is it the obvious amount to award as a penalty for
failing the burden of proof. Without a principle, intermediate
awards are a solution in practice, but not in theory, and the lack of
a theory means that such damages awards are (and will continue to
be) unpredictable.
D. Statutory Benchmarks and Caps
If the problem of damages fundamentally arises because courts
lack the information to determine the true value of a loss, then one
way to circumvent all of this is to have a legislature prescribe some
alternative benchmark upon which to base damages calculations. To
the extent the new benchmark is easy to apply, there would be no
information difficulty and no dilemma.
Section 289 of the design patent statute provides an example of
this kind of statutory benchmark. This section states that an infringer of a design patent is liable to a prevailing patent owner “to
the extent of his total profit.”206 Setting the benchmark for design
patent damages at the defendant’s total profit rather than at the
value of the patented design means that design patent damages are
relatively easy to compute. For example, if Samsung infringes an
Apple design patent by using the iTunes icon in a Galaxy smartphone, then it is difficult to determine how much the iTunes icon is
worth as a proportion of the entire smartphone; but it is easy to

genuinely principled, resting with respect to every step that is involved in reaching judgment
on analysis and reasons quite transcending the immediate result that is achieved.”).
205. In some sense, my proposal in Part IV can be understood as providing a principle for
how to calculate intermediate awards, though as a matter of semantic clarity I would prefer
to style deviations from the court’s best estimate of the correct amount as an explicit “penalty.”
206. 35 U.S.C. § 289 (2012). A reader might notice some similarity between this statute and
17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (2012). The two are different at a theoretical level. Section 504(b) is
ultimately trying to determine the value of the copyrighted work; it merely places the burden
on the defendant to prove this value by deducting everything not attributable to the
copyrighted portion. See supra note 184. Section 289 is not trying to determine the value of
the patented feature and thus has no provision for deducting nonpatented features.
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determine Samsung’s total profit.207 A statutory benchmark thus
solves the dilemma in some sense.
The information-forcing dilemma nonetheless provides many
insights about a statutory benchmark like § 289. First, statutory
benchmarks are often created as a second-level reaction to a firstlevel incarnation of the dilemma. Section 289 itself was enacted in
the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s decision in Dobson v. Hartford
Carpet Co., in which the Court held that “[t]he burden [of proving
damages] is upon the plaintiff, and, if he fails to give the necessary
evidence, but resorts, instead, to inference and conjecture and speculation, he must fail for want of proof,”208 and accordingly directed
an award of six cents to the patentee.209 By setting the damages
benchmark at total profit rather than at the true value of the
patented feature, § 289 makes it easy for a patentee to prove the
relevant benchmark and solves the problem of harsh zero (or sixcent) awards.
The second insight is that, as a reaction to the first-level incarnation of the dilemma, a statutory benchmark solves one side of the
problem, but at the price of neglecting the other side. Specifically,
a statutory benchmark makes damages computations easy, but,
because damages are no longer measured according to a benchmark
of compensating the plaintiff for the value of his loss, awards
become unjust. To return to the example of Samsung using the
iTunes icon, few people would find it sensible to award Apple all of
Samsung’s profit for infringement by a minor feature.210
The unjust outcomes generate a third-level reaction, which is that
courts attempt to reform the benchmark to achieve better correspondence between damages awards and actual losses. This is exactly
what happened with § 289. In the recent case of Samsung Electronics Co. v. Apple Inc., the Supreme Court held that § 289 should be
understood not as granting the patentee a right to the total profit of
207. See generally SAMSUNG , 2014 SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS ANNUAL REPORT 3 (2014), http://
www.samsung.com/us/aboutsamsung/investor_relations/financial_information/downloads/
2015/SECAR2014_Eng_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZM4M-RSRW].
208. 114 U.S. 439, 444 (1885).
209. Id. at 447; see also Dobson v. Dornan, 118 U.S. 10, 18 (1886) (directing six-cent award
for failure of damages proof).
210. See Mark A. Lemley, A Rational System of Design Patent Remedies, 17 STAN . TECH.
L. REV. 219, 221 (2013) (arguing the total profit rule “makes no sense” and “drastically
overcompensates the owners of design patents”).
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the infringer, but only to the profit based on the particular “article
of manufacture” to which the patent pertained.211 More importantly,
the Court held that the relevant “article of manufacture” is not
necessarily the finished product that is sold to consumers, but could
be a smaller component such as a screen or case.212 The Court did
not, however, further specify what constituted the relevant “article
of manufacture”—when can it be a component instead of the finished product? And how small a component can count?—and instead
simply remanded the case to the lower court.213
The payoff of understanding the dilemma is that it allows us to
see both the impetus for the Court taking the case to begin with, as
well as the reasons for its minimalist and uninformative eventual
disposition. The impetus for taking the case quite clearly is that the
most obvious interpretation of the statute—patentees receive a
defendant’s entire profit from the infringing sale of a finished
product—leads to overcompensatory awards when the product
includes both patented and unpatented components. By potentially
limiting the recovery to profits attributable to a smaller component,
the Court can avoid grossly overcompensatory outcomes.
But doing so creates a new problem—the court now has an
information-forcing dilemma in trying to ascertain the amount of
profit attributable to a component, which, unlike a finished product,
does not have easily observed prices and profits. If the court
requires the plaintiff to prove the profit attributable to the component, then the plaintiff will fail to come up with a precise number,
and the court will be faced with the choice of either awarding
zero—an undercompensatory outcome that the statute clearly is
designed to avoid214—or awarding its own guess—which will be
arbitrary, as well as reduce incentives for evidence production in the
future. If the court requires a defendant to prove the amount, the
same dilemma emerges, in that defendants will also have difficulty
proving a precise profit number. The court can again react to this
failure of proof either by awarding its own guess (same problems as
above), or it can impose some kind of penalty on the defendant, such
211. 137 S. Ct. 429, 434 (2016) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 289 (2012)).
212. See id. at 435 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 289).
213. See id. at 436.
214. More precisely, “$250,” since the statute provides this minimum amount. 35 U.S.C.
§ 289 (2012). Of course, given the cost of litigation, a $250 recovery is effectively a zero award.
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as by giving the total profit for entire product to the plaintiff, which
brings back the overcompensation problem. By issuing a minimalist
opinion and remanding, the Supreme Court avoided definitively
choosing any of these unsavory options,215 but it does not solve the
information difficulty and instead simply passes the problem to the
lower court.
IV. PAYOFFS AND A SOLUTION
Thus far, the payoffs of my analysis have mostly been a matter of
conceptual clarity. Understanding the information-forcing dilemma
allows a reader to see past vague and unhelpful doctrinal formulations and better understand what damages doctrine in various fields
is about. It also reveals that the ostensibly different doctrinal inquiries in various fields share many commonalities.216 Once we look
beyond the surface, it turns out that damages debates in patent,
contract, tort, and antitrust law share many similarities, even
though the literature in these areas rarely interact.217
Better conceptual clarity also helps explain why debates keep
going in circles and making no progress. Stated simply, the dilemma
is a multisided problem, but courts, legislators, and academic
commentators have tended to focus on one side or another at any
one time, depending on what is salient at the particular time or in
a particular case. When courts notice a problem of low quality
evidence, they react—as the court in Lucent did—by raising the
burden of proof,218 without realizing that this can solve the problem
of low quality evidence only at the price of creating a problem of
unjust zero-damages awards. When courts notice the problem of
unjust zero-damages awards, they react—as the court in Apple
did—by directing juries to take their best guess,219 without realizing
that this destroys the incentive for rigorous evidence. Without
understanding the full nature of the problem, any attempted
215. See Samsung, 137 S. Ct. at 436.
216. See supra Part II.
217. See John M. Golden & Karen E. Sandrik, A Restitution Perspective on Reasonable
Royalties, 36 REV. LITIG . (forthcoming 2017) (arguing that patent law should draw on general
restitution principles to better theorize how damages should be calculated).
218. See supra text accompanying notes 60-67.
219. See supra text accompanying notes 69-73.
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solution will necessarily be incomplete, and whatever facet of the
problem gets neglected will resurface later to undermine the
solution. The law therefore becomes either full of self-contradictory
pronouncements (for example, plaintiffs must prove the amount of
their loss,220 except when they do not have to221), or is consistent
only at the level of vague generalities that provide no guidance (for
example, that damages must be proven with “reasonable” certainty).
This kind of conceptual payoff may not satisfy the more practicalminded readers in my audience, who ask what courts should do.
This Part will provide an answer to that question. Courts should
require a party to produce damages information—which is the same
as saying that a court should penalize a party for failing to produce
information—if and only if two conditions are met. First, the social
benefit of having additional information on some issue must
outweigh the social cost of collecting the information and presenting
it in court (the cost-effectiveness criterion). Second, courts should
impose the burden of proof on the party that can more cheaply
produce the information required (the cheaper-producer criterion).
Put together, this “cheaper cost-effective producer” principle provides a coherent principle to guide courts on how to approach the
dilemma.
My claim here is both normative and descriptive. My argument
is not only that courts ought to craft damages doctrine according to
the cheaper cost-effective producer principle, but also that the
existing doctrine can be understood to have already done this to
some extent. Viewed through this lens, the vague and messy existing doctrine is not just an incoherent morass; it is a clumsy and imperfect attempt by courts to arrive at this unifying principle, which
courts have somewhat intuited but have not been able to articulate.
Clearly articulating the principle therefore allows the doctrine to be
coherently interpreted and better implemented in the future.
A. The Cost-Effectiveness Criterion
The cost-effectiveness criterion states that courts should require
the production of a particular piece of information only when the
220. See supra notes 176-78 and accompanying text.
221. See supra text accompanying notes 178-81.
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benefits of having the information exceed the costs of collecting
and producing the evidence to prove it. The normative justification
for this criterion should be self-evident: the law should not do
something (or require something to be done) unless the benefits
exceed the costs. The same justification underlies cost-benefit tests
throughout the law,222 the most famous being the Hand formula for
negligence.223
It is important to emphasize that the test is whether the social
benefits exceed the social costs. If the private benefits of a party
disclosing information to a court exceed the private costs, then a
party would disclose the information voluntarily—there would be no
need for a court-imposed, information-forcing rule such as a burden
of proof to compel the disclosure.224 The relevant question is whether the social benefits of having a particular piece of damages information—the social benefits being that a court will be able to
render a more informed decision, which in turn better accomplishes
whatever social policy objective the respective legal regime is
designed to accomplish225—outweighs the social cost of collecting
and producing the evidence required to furnish a court with the
information it seeks.226
This cost-effectiveness criterion is admittedly not susceptible to
any kind of direct mathematical implementation. Just as courts do
not have sufficient information to precisely calculate the value of a
loss (what we might call “first-order” information deficiency), they
are also unlikely to have sufficient information to calculate the costs

222. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 1532(a)(2) (2012) (requiring cost-benefit analysis for significant
federal regulatory actions); Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory
State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 3-6 (1995) (discussing various Executive Orders by Presidents
Reagan and Clinton that define “cost-benefit analysis as the basic foundation of decision” for
the regulatory state).
223. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (defining reasonable care in cost-benefit terms).
224. See Alex Raskolnikov, Accepting the Limits of Tax Law and Economics, 98 CORNELL
L. REV. 523, 531 (2013) (explaining that a basic economic justification for government intervention is to “align private and social costs and benefits where they would otherwise diverge”).
225. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Accuracy in the Assessment of Damages, 39 J.L.
& ECON. 191, 192 (1996) (explaining the social benefit of accurate damages determinations).
226. The social costs are likely to more closely correspond to the private costs, in that the
private costs of information production—such as hiring an investigator to find evidence—are
also generally social costs, since they consume social resources that could be deployed elsewhere.
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and benefits of obtaining better information on the value of a loss
(what we might call “second-order” information deficiency). In
particular, courts face a catch-22 in trying to assess the value of
additional information when, by definition, they do not know the
content of the information they are missing.227 The sum is that, as
a practical matter, courts are not likely to have more than a faint
intuition about what additional information might be relevant to
damages, what the cost of collecting and producing that information
would be, how much a judicial damages determination would be
enhanced if the information were produced, and the exact value of
the social benefit that comes from marginally better judicial
decision-making. All of these things would need to be known if
courts were to truly calculate the costs and benefits of additional
information.
My goal in articulating the cost-effectiveness criterion is not to
suggest that courts should attempt to actually calculate the costs
and benefits. As an analogy, no court attempts to calculate the
variables in the Hand formula.228 The point of the Hand formula
in tort law is not to allow courts to actually quantify B, P, and L,229
but to give a meaningful definition of what constitutes “reasonable
care,” so that courts have something to analyze rather than simply
throw the entire question to a black-box jury.230 Similarly, in the
absence of a clear articulation of the cost-effectiveness criterion,
the standards of proof in damages law are vague, incoherent, and
often self-contradictory.231 Nobody knows what “reasonable certainty” or “just and reasonable inference” actually means. What the
227. Cf. Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention,
in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 615
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research ed., 1962) (describing the informational paradox where a
potential purchaser of information cannot assess its value without first knowing the content
of the information).
228. Moisan v. Loftus, 178 F.2d 148, 149 (2d Cir. 1949) (Hand, J.) (“[A]ll such attempts [at
calculating the variables in the Hand formula] are illusory.”).
229. These refer to the burden (B), probability (P), and amount of loss (L). The Hand
formula defines negligence as the failure to take a precaution if B < PL. See United States v.
Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
230. See McCarty v. Pheasant Run, Inc., 826 F.2d 1554, 1556-57 (7th Cir. 1987) (Posner,
J.); Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48 STAN . L.
REV. 311, 331 (1996) (“The real significance of the Hand Formula, then, is not technical, but
conceptual: It isolates the elements of due care and the relations among them.”).
231. See supra Part II.

136

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:081

cost-effectiveness criterion provides is a way to more coherently
understand these terms. Viewed through a cost-effectiveness lens,
a plaintiff proves the value of a loss with “reasonable certainty” if
and only if a court believes that the plaintiff has produced all the
information that could be cost-effectively produced.232 Conversely,
a plaintiff’s proof is deficient and “speculative” if the court believes
that a plaintiff has not produced all the information that could be
cost-effectively produced.233
The cost-effectiveness criterion thus helps clarify damages
doctrine in two ways. First, it makes clear that there is a balance to
be struck. Courts already understand this in their actions, but not
always in their words. That is, the case law is replete with absolutist statements that suggest the standard of proof is alternatively
either infinitely onerous, such as requiring a plaintiff to prove the
value of a loss with certainty,234 or nonexistent, as in the most extreme version of the fact/amount rule.235 Of course, no court ever
truly applies such an extreme standard—even antitrust courts will
find a plaintiff to have failed the burden of proof at some point236—
but the cost-effectiveness criterion helps dispel the semantic confusion that often pervades judicial opinions.
Second, the cost-effectiveness criterion helps explicate the considerations that go into the balance. A court determining whether
a plaintiff (or defendant) has produced all the cost-effective information possible must analyze what types of additional information
it might want, how much the additional information is likely to
improve the court’s damages estimate, to what extent a better
judicial decision would actually affect society at large (rather than
simply effect a wealth transfer between the parties),237 and weigh all
232. See Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Wagner Elec. & Mfg. Co., 225 U.S. 604, 622
(1912) (holding that the burden of proof shifts to the defendant “after the plaintiff has proved
the existence of profits attributable to his invention and demonstrated that they are impossible of accurate or approximate apportionment”).
233. See Mammoth Oil Co. v. United States, 275 U.S. 13, 51 (1927) (“It is certainly a maxim
that all evidence is to be weighed according to the proof which it was in the power of one side
to have produced.”).
234. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
235. See supra text accompanying notes 172-77.
236. See supra text accompanying notes 123-24.
237. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Legal Advice About Information to Present in
Litigation: Its Effects and Social Desirability, 102 HARV. L. REV. 565, 589 (1989) (arguing that
more judicial information is socially significant only if individuals comprehend that infor-
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this against the likely costs of collecting and producing the additional information. As discussed above, courts are not likely to have
anything more than faint intuitions regarding these variables.238
But the point is that the cost-effectiveness criterion allows us to
identify these variables as the relevant factors for consideration. It
provides a target for the analysis. Courts may not have the information necessary to actually hit the target, but at least they will know
what they should be aiming at, whereas without the cost-effectiveness criterion they would have no idea what direction they should
be pointing.
I would additionally argue that the cost-effectiveness criterion is
not only something that courts should aim for, but is something that
they already do aim for, at least to some extent.239 For example,
when the Supreme Court states that “[t]rial and appellate courts
alike must ... observe the practical limits of the burden of proof
which may be demanded,”240 it is implicitly describing a cost-benefit
balancing test, where the benefits of a more demanding burden of
proof are to be balanced against the costs (or “practical limits”). To
be sure, the Court did not go into much detail about what the
benefits of a more demanding burden of proof are, or why there are
practical limits or costs to demanding too high a burden of proof.
That is the contribution of the cost-effectiveness criterion: to
explicate on the reasoning that the courts have not fully articulated.
But the criterion itself can be found in the case law already, albeit
implicitly and imperfectly applied.241

mation which affects judicial decisions).
238. See supra text following note 82.
239. See LAYCOCK , supra note 46, at 104 (arguing that “a fair generalization” of the case
law is a principle that the “plaintiff must prove damages with as much certainty as is reasonably possible under the circumstances”). My cost-benefit criterion gives a more precise
definition to what constitutes “reasonably possible under the circumstances.”
240. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123 (1969); see also
Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Wagner Elec. & Mfg. Co., 225 U.S. 604, 616 (1912) (stating
that the burden of proof “principle must not be pressed so far as to override others equally
important in the administration of justice”).
241. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 14, at 23 (“People can apply the principles of
economics intuitively—and thus ‘do’ economics without knowing they are doing it.”).
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B. The Cheaper-Producer Criterion
The second criterion is that a court should allocate the burden of
proof to the party that can more easily (that is, cheaply) produce the
information it seeks. The normative justification for this criterion is
also quite obvious: imposing the burden of proof on the cheaper
producer allows information to be produced at lower cost, promoting
efficiency.242 Once we understand a burden of proof as an instrumental, information-forcing mechanism—rather than as a moral principle that the party seeking to disturb the status quo has the unique
obligation to fulfill—then it quickly follows that courts can impose
the burden of proof on either a plaintiff or defendant,243 and they
should choose based on which side is better able to produce the proof
required.244
More than with the cost-effectiveness criterion, courts have
already articulated the cheaper-producer criterion in many cases.
The clearest statement of this criterion was made by the Supreme
Court in Selma, Rome & Dalton Railroad v. United States, where
the Court stated that “it has been established as a general rule of
evidence, that the burden of proof lies on the person who wishes to
support his case by a particular fact which lies more peculiarly
within his knowledge, or of which he is supposed to be cognizant.”245
Other cases contain similar statements.246
Although a cheaper-producer criterion is not strictly novel, articulating it here nonetheless provides two contributions. First,
242. See 6 JEREMY BENTHAM , An Introductory View of the Rationale of Evidence, in THE
WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 136 (1843) (arguing that the burden of proof should be placed on
the party who can fulfill it with the “least inconvenience”).
243. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON . 1, 2 (1960) (explaining that
the law can allocate a social cost to one side or the other).
244. Cf. CALABRESI, supra note 13, at 135-40, 135 n.1 (articulating a “cheapest ... cost
avoider” criterion for allocating the burden of taking precautions).
245. 139 U.S. 560, 568 (1891).
246. See, e.g., Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640-41 (1980) (placing the burden of proof on
the defendant for qualified immunity because the issue “depends on facts peculiarly within
the knowledge and control of the defendant”); United States v. Denver & Rio Grande R.R. Co.,
191 U.S. 84, 92 (1903) (“It is a general rule of evidence ... ‘that where the subject matter of a
negative averment lies peculiarly within the knowledge of the other party, the averment is
taken as true, unless disproved by that party.’”); Lindahl v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 776 F.2d
276, 280 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (placing the burden of proof on the party with the disability to prove
inability to work because “[t]he party with the best knowledge normally sustains the burden”);
Fleming v. Harrison, 162 F.2d 789, 792 (8th Cir. 1947).
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courts are not consistent about applying the criterion, and much of
the time they reflexively allocate the burden of proof to the plaintiff,
without considering the parties’ relative costs of production,247 based
on a moralistic rationale that the party seeking to change the status
quo should bear the burden of proof.248 Second, the academic literature, led by McCormick in his influential treatise, often dismisses
the cheaper-producer criterion as an insignificant consideration
based on the reasoning that modern discovery practice gives both
sides essentially equal access to the same evidence.249
On the first point, there is little to say except that applying the
cheaper-producer criterion will facilitate better and more efficient
adjudication than an unthinking, reflexive allocation of the burden
of proof to the plaintiff.250 On the second, saying that modern
discovery equalizes the cost of producing evidence miscomprehends
the “evidence” courts need. Let me elaborate on this second point.
A conceptual distinction should be drawn between two senses of
the word “evidence.” The word can either mean a class of things that
provide information about some topic (for example, evidence about
a defendant’s financial condition) or it can mean a concrete thing
within the class (for example, the defendant’s prior year 10K
statement). When McCormick and other authors argue that modern
discovery equalizes the cost of producing evidence, they are using
“evidence” in the sense of a concrete thing. And if one conceptualizes
the cheaper-producer inquiry as a question of which party is better
able to produce a concrete thing that already exists and is in a
247. See WRIGHT & MILLER , supra note 25, § 5122 (“Courts ... frequently ignore policy in
favor of formalistic methods of assigning burdens of proof.”).
248. See 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 337, at 428 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992)
(“[B]urdens of pleading and proof ... have been and should be assigned to the plaintiff who
generally seeks to change the present state of affairs.”); see, e.g., Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v.
Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 56 (2005).
249. See FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.16, at 344 (4th ed. 1992) (“Access
to evidence is a much diminished basis for allocating burden of proof in modern liberal discovery.”); 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 248, § 337, at 429 n.11 (“Expanded pretrial
discovery would seem to have diminished greatly whatever importance [the relative cost of
production] had in allocating the burdens.”); Hay, supra note 26, at 674-75; Jody S. Kraus,
Decoupling Sales Law from the Acceptance-Rejection Fulcrum, 104 YALE L.J. 129, 142-43
(1994).
250. GENE R. SHREVE & PETER RAVEN -HANSEN , UNDERSTANDING CIVIL PROCEDURE 346
(1989) (arguing that disturbing the status quo is not a good basis for allocating the burden of
proof). See generally FED . R. CIV. P. 1 (identifying the purpose of civil procedure as “the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action”).
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party’s possession, such as, “which party is better able to produce
the defendant’s prior year 10K statement?,” then the objection that
modern discovery allows each side to demand essentially all the
documents of the other side—and so largely equalizes their ability
to produce the document to a court—has validity.
But that is not what the cheaper cost-effective producer analysis
is about. It is useless to have a court consider what concrete
documents it would like to see and then ask which party is better
able to produce the document. The very fact that the court does not
have the document means that the court is unlikely to be able to
specifically identify the missing document as something it would
like to see.251 Rather, the inquiry is only meaningful if it is conceptualized at a higher level—as asking for information about a topic.
The question is not “which party is better able to produce the
defendant’s 10K statement?” The question is “which party is better
able to produce information about the defendant’s financial condition?” Framed in this manner, it is obvious that the defendant has
a significant advantage. Although the plaintiff might have all of the
defendant’s preexisting documents, the defendant still has superior
knowledge—and this means the defendant can identify the most
relevant documents, can explain any inconsistencies between the
documents, can generate new documents, and knows whom to ask
for these tasks.252 Forcing a defendant to disclose information on
this issue will thus be much more effective than trying to coax the
information out of a plaintiff.

251. See supra text accompanying notes 60-67, 218-19.
252. See Golden, supra note 4, at 585 (arguing that patent defendants are likely to have
better knowledge of the value of a component relative to its part in a larger product); see also
Hay & Spier, supra note 30, at 419 (“[D]iscovery does not render irrelevant the question of
relative presentation costs.”).
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C. Implementing the Cheaper Cost-Effective Producer Principle
The most obvious objection to my solution is that courts will not
have the information to implement the principle. As explained in
Section A, one response to this objection is that I am not envisioning
anything more than rough guesses on the costs and benefits,
imperfectly and intuitively applied. A second response, however, is
that the cheaper cost-effective producer principle is capable of more
simple application than one might think. Specifically, courts can
implement the principle by using the following methodology: (1) At
the close of evidence, a court determines whether either party has
been negligent in producing evidence; if no party is negligent then
the court proceeds to the merits determination. (2) If the court
believes one party has been negligent, it penalizes the negligent
party (by reducing damages if the negligent party is the plaintiff, or
increasing them if the defendant is the negligent party). (3) If the
court believes both parties have been negligent, it penalizes the
more negligent party.
By using the language of “negligence,” I am obviously drawing on
the analogy to tort law, and the economic analysis of negligence law
explains why the methodology above effectively implements the
cheaper cost-effective producer principle.253 What I am proposing is
essentially a comparative negligence regime: in ordinary tort law,
“negligence” is the failure to take a cost-benefit-justified precaution
to prevent a social loss254—the social losses typically being things
like car accidents and the precautions being things like careful
driving. In my proposal, “negligence” is also the failure to take costbenefit-justified precautions to prevent a social loss; the only
difference is that the social loss is an ill-informed judicial decision
and the precaution to prevent this loss is the production of evidence.
A court determining whether any party has negligently failed to
produce evidence, therefore, is effectively determining whether all
reasonably available—that is, cost-effective—information has been

253. See Mark F. Grady, Common Law Control of Strategic Behavior: Railroad Sparks and
the Farmer, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 15, 15 (1988) (explaining how economic analysis “divulges the
basic structure of negligence liability”).
254. Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD . 29, 32 (1972).
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produced.255 Rules (1) and (2) thus combine to effectuate the costeffectiveness criterion.
Rules (2) and (3) combine to effectuate the cheaper-producer criterion. The effect of (2) is obvious enough—if only one party has not
produced all the evidence it can cost-effectively produce, then that
party is the cheaper producer of additional damages evidence.256
Rule (3) overcomes an intuitive problem that a court cannot
formally allocate a burden of proof on both sides at the same time.
But by threatening to penalize whichever side is more negligent, the
court sets off a virtuous cycle where the threat of a penalty on one
side (say the plaintiff) induces the plaintiff to produce more and
better evidence, which in turn induces the defendant to produce
more and better evidence, and so on—the cycle stops only at the
point where both parties have produced all cost-effective evidence
and therefore do not expect to be found negligent at all.
One obvious question is how much the penalty should be. In
theory, if parties are fully confident that courts will only apply the
penalty when a party has been negligent—that is, where a party
fails to produce evidence that it could have cost-effectively produced—then there is no upper ceiling to the optimal penalty. Even
reducing a plaintiff’s damages to zero, or increasing a defendant’s
liability by billions, would not cause overdeterrence because the
threat of a massive penalty would only incentivize compliance, and
it would incentivize compliance only in cases where such compliance
is socially beneficial. This idealized theory tends to support harsh
bright-line penalties—such as reducing a plaintiff’s award to zero or
automatically doubling a defendant’s liability—because they have
little substantive downside while minimizing administrative cost.257
Such a rationale may explain why traditional doctrine penalizes a
plaintiff’s failure to produce evidence with a zero award and has no
255. See Nance, supra note 30, at 627-28 (providing similar definition of when evidence is
“unreasonably incomplete”).
256. It is useful to clarify here that the cheaper cost-effective producer analysis is a marginal analysis, just as the negligence inquiry is a marginal inquiry. See LANDES & POSNER, supra
note 14, at 87. That is, the question for a court is not which side is the cheaper producer of
damages information overall, but which side is the cheaper producer of additional damages
information beyond whatever the court already knows.
257. Cf. Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON .
169, 183-84 (1968) (presenting the economic model in which extremely severe punishments
facilitate lower administrative costs in crime prevention).
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allowance for intermediate amounts, even if one might suspect
intermediate awards are common in practice.258
We do not live in an ideal world, and the possibility of judicial
error in the determination of negligence means that it is possible to
overdeter parties into spending too much on evidence collection.
Given this, courts should generally try to set the penalty at a level
to prevent both under- and overdeterrence—that is, the expected
penalty should be just slightly greater than the private cost savings
from failing to produce evidence,259 such that a party will be better
off producing the evidence. To the extent that precisely determining
this optimal amount is administratively difficult, however, courts
should generally err on the side of higher penalties because, as
explained above, the concern about overdeterrence is limited.
Courts have not explicitly articulated the methodology that I describe here, but sometimes cases suggest a burden-shifting framework that works similarly. A good example is Westinghouse Electric
& Manufacturing Co. v. Wagner Electric & Manufacturing Co., a
case dealing with the burden of proving the correct apportionment
of profits for patent infringement.260 The Supreme Court held that,
if a patentee “has exhausted all available means of apportionment”
but still cannot prove a reasonably precise number, then the
patentee is entitled to the entire profit unless the defendant can
prove the correct apportionment.261 As the Court acknowledged,
“[T]his is but another way of saying that the burden of proof is on
the defendant.”262 But the Court emphasized that the burden is not
shifted until “after the plaintiff has proved the existence of profits
attributable to his invention and demonstrated that they are impossible of accurate or approximate apportionment.”263 Viewed from
the cheaper cost-effective producer principle, this burden-shifting
258. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 6.4, at 220 (8th ed. 2011)
(arguing that the common law adopted contributory negligence because it was administratively cheaper).
259. By “expected,” I mean that courts should adjust for the possibility that a negligent
party may not be caught. If a party has only a 25 percent chance of being caught, then, in
cases where they are caught, the actual penalty must be multiplied fourfold. See A. Mitchell
Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869,
874 (1998).
260. 225 U.S. 604, 614 (1912).
261. Id. at 621-22.
262. Id. at 622.
263. Id. (emphasis added).
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framework reflects the two criteria I have described. The plaintiff
bears the initial burden of proof, and must satisfy this burden of
proof by producing all cost-effective evidence, that is, “exhaust[ ] all
available means of apportionment.”264 Once this is done, then the
burden shifts, until the court has the best evidence that can be costeffectively obtained. At that point the work of an information-forcing
mechanism (that is, a burden of proof) is done.265
CONCLUSION
The information-forcing dilemma pervades the law of damages.
The basic way for a court to obtain better information on the value
of a loss is by strictly enforcing a rigorous burden of proof. For this
to actually work, however, there must be a credible penalty, and the
basic penalty is an award of zero damages, which is unjust when the
evidence clearly establishes there is some loss but not the precise
amount. The injustice of the zero-damages penalty, in turn, leads
courts to lower the burden of proof, which undermines the information-forcing effect.
The result of this dilemma is that damages law becomes a
confusing mess. Courts acting without an understanding of the full
nature of the problem will naturally oscillate between opposing
approaches, depending on which side of the dilemma is more salient
at a particular time and in a particular context. When courts face
complaints about speculative awards, they tighten the burden of
proof to force better information. When courts face the prospect of
awarding zero damages to sympathetic injured plaintiffs, they
loosen the burden of proof. The result is a self-contradictory doctrine
that goes in circles.
Articulating the dilemma provides a way to both understand what
ails damages law today and how to solve the problem. At least in
principle, courts should allocate the burden of proof to the cheaper
264. Id. at 621.
265. One difference between Westinghouse and my proposed methodology is that the Court
in Westinghouse would still penalize the defendant by awarding the plaintiff with the entire
profit even if the defendant produces all cost-effective evidence (as long as the evidence does
not suffice to determine the correct apportionment), see id. at 621-22, whereas my proposal
would have a court take its best guess. The difference is largely immaterial from the
perspective of economic incentives. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW
18 (6th prtg. 2003).
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producer of information, and they should require the production of
information only when it is cost-benefit-justified. This cheaper costeffective producer principle may not be susceptible to precise
implementation, but it provides a guiding lodestar to explain how
damages law should be understood. Following this lodestar allows
damages law to break out of the repetitive circle in which it has
been trapped.

